Social Memory in Athenian Public Discourse

Uses and Meanings of the Past

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Introduction

Objectives, Methods, Concepts

"What you're doing in Iraq is as important and courageous and selfless as what American troops did in places like Normandy and Iwo Jima and Korea. Your generation is every bit as great as any that came before it. And the work you do every day will shape history for generations to come."[1]

(U.S. President George W. Bush addressing U.S. troops in Baghdad, Iraq, on December 14, 2008)

"Each American who has served in Iraq has their own story. Each of you has your own story. And that story is now a part of the history of the United States of America, a nation that exists only because free men and women have bled for it, from the beaches of Normandy to the deserts of Anbar, from the mountains of Korea to the streets of Kandahar. You teach us that the price of freedom is great."[2]

(U.S. President Barack Obama addressing U.S. troops in Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, on February 27, 2009)

"But it is not possible, it is not possible that you were wrong, Athenians, to take on the danger for the freedom and safety of all [the Greeks]—I swear by those of your forefathers who bore the brunt of battle at Marathon, by those who stood in the ranks at Plataea, by those who fought the sea battles at Salamis and Artemisium, and by the many other men who lie in the public tombs, brave men, all of whom the city buried, deeming them all equally worthy of the same honor, Aeschines, not just those among them who were successful or victorious." (Dem. 18.208)

(Demosthenes justifying Athens' stance at Chaeronea to an Athenian jury in 330 BC)

1. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=85287&st1=#axzz1ntHhsZm.
2. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=85807&st=&st1=#axzz1ntHhsZm.

Objectives

Though separated by more than twenty-three hundred years, these statements have a lot in common. All three speakers recall the past in order to persuade their audiences to adopt a particular view of the present. By equating the troops' service in Iraq to the achievements of the "Greatest Generation," President George W. Bush conveys a sense of the importance and greatness of the current mission. President Barack Obama firmly grounds the soldiers' present undertaking in Iraq and Afghanistan in the American tradition: they, like their predecessors at Normandy and Korea, preserve their country through their willingness to fight and die for the sake of freedom. Similarly, to justify, before an Athenian jury, Athens' decision to oppose Philip of Macedon, Demosthenes evokes their ancestors' accomplishments during the Persian Wars; they—so the implication goes—had fought for the freedom and safety of all the Greeks, just as his generation did at Chaeronea.

The speakers allude to these past events because they regard them as deeply meaningful for their respective communities. These allusions resonate with the audiences and thus function as powerful emotive arguments in public debate. It is precisely this use of the past that lies at the heart of my investigation. That we are thereby dealing with *social memory* and not history per se is my central premise. The D-day landing (June 1944), the battle of Iwo Jima (February 1945), the Korean War (1950–53), the land battles of Marathon (490 BC) and Plataea (479 BC), and the sea battles at Salamis and Artemisium (480 BC) are all historical events, yet they are not mentioned by the speakers for the sake of constituting and disseminating historical knowledge. We learn nothing about the historical circumstances, the enemy, the reasons for these wars, the course and outcome of the battles, the strategies and tactics employed, their repercussions and aftermath. On the contrary, common knowledge is taken for granted. These events have become an integral part of the social memory, that is, the collective historical consciousness of a community. The particular historical circumstances had faded over time, and these events had become symbols of national character.[3] Such shared images of the past, often idealized and distorted, have long been viewed as an unreliable counterpart of history.[4] To refute such "myths" and uncover the historical reality behind them has been one of the historian's most noble tasks. Yet, in recent decades, anthropologists,

3. A. Assmann (2001) 6824.

4. For this reason, such myths were deliberately abandoned by professional historians in the nineteenth century, who established critical historiography as an autonomous discursive discipline with its own standards of truth and authority, specific rules of verification, and intersubjective argument. Cf. A. Assmann (2001) 6824–25; Markovits & Reich (1997) 14–15.

sociologists, and historians have discovered social memory as a subject of study in its own right, as an invaluable key to a group's mentality, which can provide insights into the ideological forces that hold a society together.[5] By offering people a shared image of their past, social memory creates feelings of identity and belonging and provides them with a design for their future. Yet social memory is also—by its very nature—elusive and dynamic. Just as social groups change over time, so do their memories: the past—while not entirely at the disposal of the present—is nevertheless constantly "modeled, invented, reinvented, and reconstructed by the present."[6]

These are some general characteristics of social memory that can be observed across time and space, as comparative studies have shown. Yet it is important to emphasize that the formation, transmission, and contestation of social memory depends on each society's particular communicative framework. Classical Athens is an especially interesting case, since it exemplifies, as Rosalind Thomas has shown, a society in transition from orality to literacy, where oral modes of communication played a predominant role.[7] Following the rise of memory studies in other fields, classicists have begun to use social memory as an analytical tool to explore how the ancient Greeks remembered their past. By and large, these scholars focus on the ideological power and societal functions of collective memories and explore the transmission and changing meanings of various oral traditions.[8]

Despite these important inroads into Greek social memory, many significant aspects have not yet been sufficiently explored. In light of the striking similarities between the quotations cited above, three questions in particular are worth asking. First, how did fifth- and fourth-century Athenians learn about their past, and what did this past mean to them? Second, how did individual speakers make use of the past and operate within the complex Athenian memorial framework? Third, to what extent did these shared images of the past influence the decision-making process in a polis like fourth-century Athens, where a free citizenry publically debated its foreign and domestic policies in the assembly, the law courts, and other democratic institutions?

At first sight, it may seem impossible to recover the role that a people's

5. For a comprehensive introduction to social memory studies, see Fentress & Wickham (1992); Misztal (2003); Erll & Nünning (2008). For a discussion of important characteristics, see "What Is Social Memory?" below, 7–19.

6. J. Assmann (1997) 9.

7. R. Thomas (1989).

8. See, for instance, Loraux (1986), (2002); R. Thomas (1989); Higbie (1997); Forsdyke (1999), (2001); (2005), (2011); Gehrke (2001), (2003); Wolpert (2002); Alcock (2002); G. Anderson (2003); Tang (2006); Luraghi (2008); Foxhall, Gehrke, & Luraghi (2010); Shear (2011). For a decidedly non-functionalist approach, see Grethlein (2010). For Roman social memory, see Walter (2004); Gowing (2005); H. I. Flower (2006); Stein-Hölkeskamp & Hölkeskamp (2006); Dasen & Späth (2010).

memories played in their decision-making process more than twenty-three hundred years ago. Yet, in the case of fourth-century Athens, we are fortunate to have access to a type of evidence often misunderstood, the historical allusions in the surviving speeches of the Attic orators. These are, if not a verbatim record, at least a close reflection of arguments actually made in Athenian public discourse. This is, to some extent, also true for the speeches in Xenophon's *Hellenica*: Xenophon, as an Athenian and contemporary, was closely familiar with fourth-century Athenian historical consciousness.

By contextualizing the orators' allusions within the complex net of remembrances and beliefs held by their audiences, I seek to assess the ideological and emotive power of these shared memories, which I regard not as merely empty rhetorical phrases or propagandistic cover-ups for *Realpolitik* but as crucial factors in political decision making.[9] In so doing, I also try to explain common "distortions" in their transmission and to determine the leeway that orators had in departing from predominant versions.[10]

I approach these important questions from two different angles. First, in chapter 1, I *thematically* examine the different "carriers" of Athenian social memory available to the speakers and their audiences. Young Athenians learned about their past through polis-wide public commemorations and festivals, as well as through the process of socialization as members of smaller subgroups (e.g., families, sympotic groups, *demes*, and tribes), all of whom had their own memorial traditions. Contact with guest-friends could provide insight into the memorial repertoire of other Greek communities. Landmarks, monuments, and inscriptions, forming the Athenian *cadre matériel*, functioned as material reminders of crucial events, while assembly and law courts provided the venue for the orators' refreshing and reshaping of the past. Elite speakers could also draw from the works of the Greek historians, poets, and other orators.

Second, since the Athenians' shared image of the past originated, to a large extent, from their experience with other Greek and foreign communities, I focus, in chapters 2–5, on one exemplary case: the role of Thebes in Athenian social memory and discourse. From early on, the Athenian' relations with their northern neighbor Thebes were very complex, varying over time from military cooperation and peaceful coexistence to tense rivalry and outright war, thus providing both cities with a broad spectrum of experiences from which to draw

9. Cf. Markovits & Reich (1997) 9–20, who argue that "collective memory is a crucial ingredient in every country's policymaking and perhaps nowhere more important than in foreign policy" (18). See "Public Discourse and Decision Making," 30–36.

10. I use the term *distortion* in a neutral sense, without the connotation of willful manipulation, simply to denote the discrepancy between what we think actually happened and the way it was remembered. For this reason, Oswyn Murray (2001) 28 introduces the term *deformation* for this phenomenon.

(fig. 1). Whenever Athenian-Theban relations were discussed, participants in the debate called on earlier experiences to explain their analysis and propose their solution to others, as seen, for instance, in the negotiations leading to an Athenian-Theban alliance in 395. This study will thus help us to better comprehend some of the policy choices both *poleis* made during the fourth century BC.

Historical references to Thebes cluster around four particular events, each discussed in a separate chapter in this book: Thebes' medizing in 480–479 (chap. 2), the mythical story of the burial of the fallen Argives (chap. 3), Theban aid to the Athenian democrats in 403 (chap. 4), and the Theban proposal to eradicate Athens in 404 (chap. 5).[11] In each case, I explore how a particular event was perceived, how its recollection was subsequently transformed from "remembered" to "commemorated" history, and by which means it was transmitted to younger generations. By comparing these memories to the actual historical events (as far as we can reconstruct them) and by taking into account general characteristics of social memory, I explain various "distortions" in the process of their transmission.

My reading of the Attic orators from the perspective of social memory also has further merits. First, it contributes to the solution of an old problem, that is, how best to understand the orators' historical allusions.[12] Second, thanks to Herman Mogens Hansen and others, we have come to a much better understanding of the technical aspects of the Athenian assembly, the law courts, and other democratic institutions, but we still do not fully comprehend what it was to *be* an Athenian.[13] I hope this reconstruction of the Athenian memorial framework will complement the work of Josiah Ober, Greg Anderson, Sara Forsdyke, and others and enhance our understanding of the shared collective consciousness that bound the Athenians together within their institutions.[14] A further objective of this book is to engage in the debate about ways of doing history. Framing this historical investigation in terms of social memory has two particular virtues. First, it naturally integrates a variety of different source

11. It might seem odd that the chapter sequence does not follow the chronology of the events. I begin with Thebes' medizing (chap. 2), since I regard the Persian Wars (including Athens' experience of Thebes in it) as the most important moment for the formation of the Athenian self-image. It was this very self-image, I argue, that was projected back into the past and that shaped the collective memory of the mythical exploit on behalf of the fallen Argives (chap. 3). Similarly, I end this monograph with the chapter on the Theban proposal to eradicate Athens (chap. 5), since the annihilation of Thebes through Alexander in 335 brings together all of Thebes' sins and thus provides a suitable thematic and chronological capstone for this investigation.

12. See "Participant Evidence: The Attic Orators and Their Interpretation," 36–43.

13. Cf. Hansen (1991), which represents a comprehensive synthesis of his numerous individual studies of Athenian democratic institutions.

14. Ober (1989); G. Anderson (2003); Forsdyke (2005).

Fig. 1. Map of Attica and southern Boeotia

materials (literary texts of different genres, inscriptions, monuments, artifacts and other material remains, landscapes, geography, etc.) by tying them all together as elements of a community's memorial framework, elements that mutually influence and sustain each other. Second, when dealing with literary sources such as the Greek historians or the Attic orators, understanding the characteristics of social memory can help us to move beyond purely intertextual models of interpretation and develop a more nuanced appreciation of the conditions of origin and the ideological aspects of these works. Finally, this analysis of Athenian historical consciousness might serve as a model for other studies of historical social memory and discourse in the ancient world. I hope that this sociopolitical analysis of the orators' use of the past will be of interest to students of Athenian history, ideology, democratic discourse, and rhetoric.

This brief sketch of the central premises and the main objectives of this book is followed by a more detailed exposition of my methodology. This includes a discussion of some general characteristics of social memory, a delineation of my use of the concept, and an explication of my underlying assumptions concerning the nature of public discourse and decision making.

What Is Social Memory?

Social or collective memory—"the shared remembrances of group experience"[15]—is a powerful force in every community, since it creates collective identity by giving individuals a shared image of their past, providing them with an explanation of the present and a vision of the future.[16] Collective memory keeps alive the memory of crucial moments of the past, victories and defeats, inner conflicts and outside aggressions. These memories often cluster around foundational events of a heroic or traumatic nature and have a profound impact on the group's self-image and its sense of the world.[17] The exodus from Egypt, the Persian Wars, and the Revolutionary War of 1776 are examples of such "constellative myths" in Jewish, ancient Greek, and U.S. historical consciousness.[18] Collective memories generally do not stand up to the scrutiny of professional historians; they are often simplistic, contain fictitious elements,

15. Alcock (2002) v.

16. The body of scholarship on social memory is vast. For a concise introduction to the concept, see Markovits & Reich (1997) 14–20; Alcock (2002) 1–35. Fentress & Wickham (1992), Misztal (2003) and Erll & Nünning (2008) offer comprehensive treatments of the concept.

17. For this notion of shared historical experience as an imaginary bond that binds a group together, see Benedict Anderson's (1991) seminal work *Imagined Communities*.

18. For the exodus as constellative myth, see J. Assmann (1997) 7; for the Persian War, Alcock (2002) 74.

and show signs of distortions.[19] Yet they are real to the remembering community.[20] What people remember about the past shapes their collective identity and determines their friends and enemies.[21] Social memory can legitimize the status quo and serve as a repository for future decision making. For these reasons, it is also known as "myth," "meaningful history," "usable past," "imagined and remembered history," "cultural memory," "believed history," or "intentional history."[22]

Individual and Collective Memory

Social memory is a powerful force but is often hard to grasp; some critics even deny its existence. Their central objection is that remembering is an individual mental process and thus absolutely personal. "Just as a nation cannot eat or dance," argues one critic, "neither can it speak or remember."[23] This is a legitimate criticism, which seems to stem from the deep-rooted fear that social memory could become a new form of the old essentialist categories (collective, people, *Volk*) from which historians have only recently freed themselves.

Partially to disassociate themselves from such suspicions, most scholars in the field prefer the term *social memory* to Halbwachs' *collective memory*.[24] Maurice Halbwachs, a student of the French sociologist Émile Durkheim and the first to use the concept, deserves credit for establishing memory as a social category. Many of Halbwachs' tenets, such as the importance of collective memory for group identity as well as its presentist nature, are still the starting point for

19. Despite the current enthusiasm for memory studies, Gehrke (2001) 313 is right to remind us that where "history becomes myth, historical research must stand up and speak, urgently and emphatically."

20. Loraux (1986) 171; Fentress & Wickham (1992) 25–26. For the relationship between history and memory, cf. A. Assmann (2001).

21. For the link between collective memory and identity, see Prager (2001) 2223–24.

22. Cf. A. Assmann (2001) 6824. Fentress and Wickham (1992) 25 define social memory as an "expression of collective experience: social memory identifies a group, giving it a sense of its past and defining its aspiration for the future." Gehrke (2001) 286 introduces the term *intentional history* to denote "that which a society knows and holds for true about its past, [which] is of fundamental significance for the *imaginaire*, for the way a society interprets and understands itself, and therefore for its inner coherence and ultimately its collective identity." Misztal (2003) 158 defines collective or social memory as "a group's representation of its past, both the past that is commonly shared and the past that is collectively commemorated, that enacts and gives substance to that group's identity, its present conditions and its vision of the future." Closely related is Jan Assmann's *kulturelles Gedächtnis*; cf. J. Assman (1995) 132: "The concept of cultural memory comprises that body of reusable texts, images, and rituals specific to each society in each epoch, whose 'cultivation' serves to stabilize and convey that society's self-image. Upon such collective knowledge, for the most part (but not exclusively) of the past, each group bases its awareness of unity and particularity."

23. Funkenstein (1993) 6. For an excellent discussion of this problem, see Alcock (2002) 15–16.

24. Fentress & Wickham (1992) ix. While stressing the dynamic and communicative aspects of the concept, I will, for the sake of variation, use both terms interchangeably.

all research in the field.[25] Yet his view that all collective memory is "socially framed" and thus *entirely* dependent on the social group that determines what is "memorable" and how it will be remembered shows signs of social determinism and fails to acknowledge "the dialectical tensions between personal memory and the social construction of the past."[26] Scholars of social memory, therefore, have to conceive of a model that does justice to memory's collective aspects but "does not render the individual a sort of automaton, passively obeying the interiorized collective will."[27]

There are various ways to conceptualize collective memory without falling into the trap of reifying a monolithic group mind. Since social memory is based on the multitude of people who do the remembering, it is of paramount importance to consider the results of psychological research on individual memory.[28] Human memory is a highly complex system, and there is still much we do not know despite important advances in cognitive psychology and neuroscientific research.[29] This is not the place to attempt a systematic description of the various subsystems and conceptual subdivisions of memory.[30] Instead, I will focus on a few selected aspects that are relevant for my investigation of Athenian social memory.

It has been shown that we perceive the world that surrounds us with our

25. Halbwachs' seminal works consist of *Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire* (1925), *La topographie légendaire des évangiles en terre sainte: Étude de mémoire collective* (1941), and *La Mémoire collective* (1950), which was posthumously edited after Halbwachs' murder in Buchenwald in March 1945 and first translated into English in 1980. For recent critiques, see Misztal (2003) 50–56; Funkenstein (1993) 7–9; Connerton (1989) 36–40.

26. Misztal (2003) 54. Similarly, Fentress & Wickham (1992) ix.

27. Fentress & Wickham (1992) ix.

28. R. Thomas (1989) 11–13; Misztal (2003) 5; Erll (2008) 4–6; Manier & Hirst (2008) 254.

29. For a brief introduction to the psychology of individual memory, see Baddeley (1989); for a comprehensive discussion, Baddeley (1976). For its relevance for collective memory studies, see Fentress & Wickham (1992) 1–40; Misztal (2003) 9–12; Manier & Hirst (2008).

30. Baddeley (1989) 35 and Schacter (2001) 27–28 distinguish three interdependent subsystems: sensory memory (responsible for perception), working or short-term memory, and long-term memory. I am particularly concerned with the latter in this study. Another classification framework is based on the content of long-term memories: *episodic memories* refer to personally experienced events (i.e., we remember where and when we learned or experienced something), whereas *semantic memories* lack this temporal and spatial specificity (i.e., we remember a fact or thing but do not recall where we learned it): cf. Tulving (1983); Manier & Hirst (2008) 256. Yet Baddeley (1976) 317–18, (1989) 42–43, and Fentress & Wickham (1992) 20–21 call into question Tulving's strict dichotomy and rightly emphasize the interdependence between these two kinds of memories; semantic memory is continually underpinned and complemented by personal and sensory memory. Another useful way of subdividing long-term memories is to distinguish between *procedural memory* (i.e. knowing *how* to do something) and *declarative memory* (i.e. knowing *that* something occurred or is the case): cf. Manier & Hirst (2008) 256–57; Baddeley (1989) 43–45. In this study I deal primarily with declarative memories, that is, with the deliberate and conscious act of recalling the past. Yet it is important to note that procedural memories also play an important role in preserving the past, which is embodied in nontextual performances and commemorative rituals, such as the Panathenaic procession. For this type of bodily social memory, see Connerton (1989).

senses (especially seeing and hearing) and make sense of new experiences with the help of the mental framework that we acquire in the process of our socialization.[31] We can only properly remember something if we first conceive of it in intelligible patterns. From the moment of perception, memories are, therefore, conceptualization and thus simplifications of a more complex reality.[32] In this process, language plays an important role, since it organizes the information in conceptual categories that are immediately available for articulation.[33] But memories are hardly ever purely semantic concepts. On the contrary, psychological experiments and everyday experience show that semantic and sensory (especially visual) memories tend to complement each other.[34] It is hard, for instance, to think of the battle of Marathon unaccompanied by any kind of visual images, be it Miltiades' leading the charge, Athenian hoplites running down the hill, or Persians fleeing to their ships. During this process of conceptualization, complex events become much more simplified and are associated with a few distinct visual images.[35]

Perceived information is held briefly in our working or short-term memory, where some of it is further encoded into long-term memory. The more we ponder or talk about an incident and the more we are emotionally involved, the more elaborative the encoding process becomes, and the more likely we are to retain the information in our long-term memory. We thus encode when and where an incident occurred, who was involved, what happened, and other distinguishing details of the event. These people, places, dates, and distinctive

31. Eber & Neil (2001) 3–6. Already Bartlett, one of the pioneers of cognitive psychology, pointed out that our knowledge of the world comprises a set of models or schemata derived from previous experience. When we learn something new, we base our learning on already existing schemata. Both the processes of learning and remembering thus involve an "effort after meaning." Cf. Bartlett (1932); Baddeley (1976) 9–15; Fentress & Wickham (1992) 32–36; Prager (2001) 2223.

32. Kertzer (2001) 13174: "The selective perception and radical simplification of potentially relevant stimuli are necessary if we are to make any sense at all out of the infinite number of potential observations that we could theoretically make." Cf. Fentress & Wickham (1992) 31–32. Gombrich (1972) 246–50 illustrates the process of visual conceptualization (and simplification) in an experiment involving children who were asked to copy a famous landscape painting. In the children's copy, the delicate meadow became a simple green patch, and the cloudy sky was turned into a uniform, light gray area. The children thus created a highly simplified representation of the original by translating the nuanced painting into a set of visual concepts.

33. Fentress & Wickham (1992) 28.

34. Cf. Bartlett (1932) 47–62; Fentress & Wickham (1992) 32–36. Participants were asked by Bartlett to remember postcards showing the faces of diverse military officers. Most of the participants came up with names and little stories as *aide-mémoire*. In this experiment, semantic and visual memories complemented and conformed to each other, even when both were wrong in the sense that the memories did not conform to the original picture.

35. In chapter 5, I will argue that the ritual city destruction of Crisa was "remembered" by fifth- and fourth-century Greeks as the first emblematic city destruction by a Greek alliance and that this social memory consisted of a few distinct visual and semantic conceptualizations, such as razing the walls and selling the inhabitants into slavery.

characteristics of the event can then serve as cues for later retrieval.[36] Such cues are of fundamental importance for my investigation of Athenian social memory. I will, for instance, make the case that Thrasybulus and the mountain fortress of Phyle could prompt the recollection of the return of the Athenian exiles in 403 BC. Also, striking similarities between current and past events (e.g., between the reigns of the Spartan-backed juntas in Thebes in 382–379 and in Athens in 404–403) can serve as cues for the recollection of the latter and thus revive a possibly latent memory.[37]

It is critical to stress that the act of remembering itself is a dynamic mental process that takes place in the present. When we remember, we consciously and deliberately recover the past.[38] Whatever memories route into consciousness, however, need to be "organized into patterns so that they make some kind of continuing sense in an ever-changing present."[39] This process is comparable to reconstructing isolated puzzle pieces into a coherent picture. The very process of recall thus involves a certain degree of "re-forming or re-structuring of the 'original' memory."[40] It also involves further elaboration: in retelling an event, we supply motives, thoughts, and details based on our current general understanding of the world.[41] Every recall functions as further encoding and thus increases the durability and stability of a particular memory; yet, at the same time, every recall is a new reconstruction and, therefore, subject to the distorting influences of our present predilections and concerns.[42] Memory is, therefore, always fluid and dynamic and never static.[43] Since a group's collective memory is based on the memory of its individual members, these characteristics of individual memory apply to the group's shared remembrances as well.

36. Schacter (2001) 26–33. Cf. R. Thomas (1989) 12.

37. Cf. chapter 4.

38. Memory has, therefore, been described as "dialogue with the past," as some kind of "active orientation towards the past" or as an "act of thinking of things in their absence." See Misztal (2003) 9.

39. Young (1988) 97–98, cited in Misztal (2003) 10. Schacter (2001) 146 speaks of "hindsight bias": "we reconstruct the past to make it consistent with what we know in the present." Cf. Bartlett's (1932) concept of the "effort after meaning." See also Middleton & Brown (2008) 242–43.

40. R. Thomas (1989) 12. One part of this structuring effort before sharing a memory involves organizing it into a story, which is subject to the rules and conventions of narrative. See also Prager (2001) 2224.

41. Cf. R. Thomas (1989) 12–13. Schacter (2001) 138–60 analyzes the different ways in which our current predispositions can distort our memories. He distinguishes between consistency and change biases, hindsight biases, and egocentric and stereotypical biases.

42. A good example is autobiographical memory. Since we experience the present as connected to and resultant of the past, the memories of our own past are always consistent with our current self-image. Cf. Misztal (2003) 10; Schacter (2001) 138–44.

43. Remembering is, therefore, fundamentally different from retrieving a written document from a storage archive. For a critique of the "textual model" of memory, which is widespread among oral historians and tends to reify memories, see Fentress & Wickham (1992) 1–8.

While it is the individual who does the remembering, social memory is nevertheless different from the sum total of individual thoughts about the past.[44] Social memory comes into existence when people *talk* about the memories that they consider important enough to share with others. Consequently, both *social relevance* and *communication* are indispensable elements of this concept. For a memory to be shared, it first has to be articulated and thus depends on the shared cultural forms and conventions of language.[45] For social memory to be a useful analytical tool, it needs to retain a sense of both its individual and collective dimensions. This "intersubjectivist" approach avoids both social determinism, which subordinates individuals entirely to a collective, and the individualistic bias of psychological theories, which often ignore the importance of communicative relations between people and their social embeddedness.[46] A good analogy for the relationship between collective and individual memory is the relation between language (*langue*) and speech (*parole*), as formulated by Saussure. Both language and collective memory are idealized systems that cannot exist without individual speech acts and memories, respectively. Barbara Misztal explains,

> Variations in individual memories, which can be compared to the scope of freedom with which we use language in particular speech, reflect the degree to which a given culture permits conscious changes and variation of the narrator in the contents, symbols and structures of collective memory.[47]

One of the objectives of this investigation is to assess the degree of freedom that individual Athenians had in departing from predominant social memories.

Another way of avoiding the impression of a unified and static collective consciousness is to emphasize the existence of numerous "memory communities" that are at work at any given time.[48] Every social group derives its group identity—at least partially—from its traditions and is thus able to foster its own social memory.[49] Since large communities, such as nations, consist of

44. Cf. E. Zerubavel (1997) 96.

45. Fentress & Wickham (1992) 47; Huyssen (1995) 3; A. Assmann (2001) 6822; Misztal (2003) 6, 11. Cf. Echterhoff (2008).

46. Misztal (2003) 5, 10. See also Funkenstein (1993); Schudson (1997); E. Zerubavel (1997); Prager (1998); Sherman (1999).

47. Misztal (2003) 11. Cf. Funkenstein (1993) 5–9.

48. For memory communities, see Burke (1989) 107; Alcock (2002) 15. Alternatively, some scholars use the term *mnemonic community*. Cf. E. Zerubavel (1996); Prager (2001) 2224; Misztal (2003) 15–19.

49. J. Assmann (1995) 127, 130. Cf. Wischermann (2002) 7, challenging scholars to divert attention from the "kulturellen Großgedächtnis" toward the multitude of competing visions of the past within any given society.

numerous subgroups—for example, regional and local communities, socio-economic classes, ethnic and religious groups, the learned elite and the uneducated masses, the ruling class and the underrepresented—there are a variety of concurrent and possibly competing memories available to such a community at any given time.[50] In a free society, like classical Athens, a widely accepted image of the past needs to be negotiated, lest the social memories and group identities of its different subgroups function as centrifugal forces and endanger the cohesion of the polis as a whole.[51] A crucial arena for the contestation and negotiation of divergent memories in Athens is public discourse, manifest, for instance, in public commemorations, in the law courts, and in political debates.[52]

In conclusion, an emphasis on the communicative aspect of memory, on the interdependence between individual memory and its collective expression, and on the existence of and the individual's participation in different memory communities avoids the danger of reifying the monolithic group mind.

Ideology and Social Memory

As mentioned in the previous section, social memory is of critical importance for a group's identity and cohesion. Social groups change over time, and their memories change along with them. For this reason, it is imperative to look closely at the interdependence between a group's ideology and its collective memory.

Through cultural socialization, we acquire a particular mental framework, which aids us in making sense of the world.[53] Josiah Ober calls this mental framework "ideology" and describes it in the following way:

50. The American Civil War provides an excellent example of competing regional and ethnic memory communities. Cf. Horwitz (1998); Brundage (2000); Blight (2001), (2002).

51. For the importance of such a "Minimalkonsens in Sachen der eigenen Geschichte" for a democracy, cf. Winkler (2004). For competing memory communities in contemporary Germany, see Markovits & Reich (1997) 34–42. Through monuments, public commemorations, and official histories, oppressive regimes often try to establish their own version of the past as the dominant master narrative. They even go so far as to suppress and erase alternative memories that might undermine their legitimacy. But even there, it is possible for the oppressed groups to challenge the dominant versions of the ruling elite, for instance, by displaying publically the symbols of countermemories. The U.S. civil rights movement of the 1960s serves as an example of how a minority group successfully challenged the predominant master narrative: black countermemories of the Civil War era had been preserved within African American communities and became then—at least to some extent—part of the common U.S. historical consciousness. Cf. Kammen (1995) 334–35; Brundage (2000).

52. For an excellent discussion of the contestation and negotiation of the divisive memory of the Athenian civil war of 404/3 in fourth-century Athenian public discourse, cf. Wolpert (2002). See also Loraux (2002); Shear (2011) 286–312.

53. Eber & Neil (2001) 3–6; Brundage (2000) 4; Kertzer (2001) 13174.

> Each member of any given community makes assumptions about human nature and behavior, has opinions on morality and ethics, and holds some general political principles; those assumptions, opinions and principles which are common to the great majority of those members are best described as ideology.[54]

Ideology in this sense is not necessarily clearly articulated or logically consistent, but it comprises a set of "intellectual beliefs and emotional judgments"[55] sufficiently well organized to facilitate decisions and actions. Throughout this monograph, I follow Ober's use of the term *ideology* for this shared network of ideas, values, and beliefs within a particular community.

Ideology and social memory are intertwined in a complicated way. On the one hand, ideologies are, to a considerable extent, derived from social memory. A group's mental framework originates from its historical experience; especially heroic or traumatic experiences can fundamentally alter the image a group has of itself and of the world that surrounds it. Ideological frameworks, on the other hand, determine both the perception of the present and the recollection of the past. Consequently, changes in a community's ideological framework often lead to alterations in the social memory of earlier events.[56] This is because the natural tendency of social memory is "to suppress what is not meaningful . . . in the collective memories of the past, and interpolate or substitute what seems more appropriate or more in keeping with [a society's] particular conception of the world."[57] Often, the remembering community is not conscious of these changes.

The alteration of the Puritans' social memory during the course of the seventeenth century is a lucid example. Persecuted by King Charles I and the Church of England, they decided to emigrate to the New World to save their souls, until they would be recalled in glory to re-create their New Jerusalem at home. Yet, when Oliver Cromwell's Puritan Commonwealth offered such an opportunity only twenty years later, most Puritan immigrants did not return but declared that Christianizing heathen peoples in the New World was more imperative.

54. Ober (1989) 38. Cf. Finley (1982) 17, who speaks of a "matrix of attitudes and beliefs."

55. Hunt (1998) 20. This use of the term *ideology* is to be distinguished from its use in the narrower sense, which describes a fixed and contrived set of ideas, brought into a coherent system to promote a certain worldview, such as fascist or communist ideology.

56. Cf. Markovits & Reich (1997) 13–20. Forsdyke (2005) 259–67 offers a convincing analysis of the complex interaction between the actual historical experience of exile during the time of the Thirty and the ideological representation of exile in the Athenian democratic traditions. She demonstrates, among other things, that the recent experience of the Thirty also influenced the collective memory of exile under the Peisistratids.

57. Fentress & Wickham (1992) 58–59.

This required "that memories of their own rhetoric during the 1620s and 1630s be repressed or altered."[58]

One explanation for this phenomenon lies in the general nature of memory. Since we view the present as connected to and evolving from the past, we reconstruct our memories in accordance with the present situation; nevertheless, we regard our memories as constant and immutable.[59] A further explanation is the tendency of memory to efface previous memories in the case of habitual actions, as seen, for instance, at commemorative ceremonies. Especially in oral societies, which cannot easily refer to older versions, stories are successively altered in the process of transmission and adapted—consciously and unconsciously—to present needs.[60]

Gradual developments in a society's ideology might cause unnoticed changes and distortions in its collective memory. In comparison, extreme experiences, such as the overthrow of an older political system, a heroic victory, or a devastating defeat, often cause abrupt ideological shifts. These are frequently accompanied by the carrying out of active "memory politics" by those in charge: old traditions are suppressed or reinterpreted, and new myths, which are able to symbolize the new ideology, are created and transmitted through public commemoration, festivals, monuments, and so on.[61]

Since 1776, the new ideology of the United States of America has been deliberately promoted by annually celebrating Independence Day, with parades and public addresses that commemorate the declaration of independence from the British monarchy. The founding fathers were very conscious of the symbolic meaning of such a national holiday, as a letter written by John Adams to his wife on July 3, 1776, reveals.

> The Second Day of July 1776, will be the most memorable Epocha, in the History of America. I am apt to believe that it will be celebrated, by succeeding Generations, as the great anniversary Festival. It ought to be commemorated, as the Day of Deliverance by solemn Acts of Devotion to God Almighty. It ought to be solemnized with Pomp and Parade, with

58. Cf. Kammen (1995) 330–33, quotation at 331.

59. Schacter (2001) 138–60 calls the phenomena responsible for memory distortions of this kind "consistency bias" and "hindsight bias." Cf. Prager (2001) 2223–24.

60. This also happens in literate societies, if written records are not consulted. For the "blotting out" of previous memories through habitual actions, see Fentress & Wickham (1992) 39–40. For the crucial role of present needs, cf. Prager (2001) 2224.

61. For the formation and transmission of national memories in the modern period, see Fentress & Wickham (1992) 127–37; Hobsbawm & Ranger (1983). For changes in the commemoration of early American history after the Civil War, see Schwartz (1982).

> Shews, Games, Sports, Guns, Bells, Bonfires and Illuminations from one End of this Continent to the other from this Time forward forever more.[62]

In fifth- and fourth-century Athens, we also find major political and military upheavals—especially Cleisthenes' and Ephialtes' democratic reforms and the Persian War experience—that led to fundamental ideological shifts and changes in the Athenian master narrative and its commemoration.[63] Yet, for this period, it is much harder to identify the individuals behind particular memory politics and to pin down the date of new memorial practices, such as the public funeral for the Athenian war dead.[64] Moreover, given the multipolarity of social memory, it would be misguided to focus exclusively on the instigators and masterminds behind the official Athenian polis tradition and its manifold expressions in monuments, commemorative festivals, and other forms of public discourse. The processes in which heroic or traumatic experiences reshape a community's mental framework and become an essential part of its collective memory are extremely complex and cannot be characterized adequately by a theoretical model that views collective memory largely as the result of deliberate top-down memory politics.[65]

To get beyond the concept of political instrumentalization and fabrication, I will take the findings of other social memory studies into account in this one. It is especially useful to identify some general characteristics of how the memory of foundational events is shaped and transmitted and what kinds of distortions commonly occur.[66] In U.S. social memory, for instance, the War of Independence was memorialized in a variety of ways and has become paradigmatic, a symbol for the new nation and its ideology of freedom from tyrannical

62. A. Adams & J. Adams (1975) 142. July 2, 1776, was the day when the Continental Congress adopted a resolution severing ties with Great Britain. The formal Declaration of Independence was ratified on July 4.

63. For the "imagined political community" in Attica after Cleisthenes' reforms, see G. Anderson (2003). For the impact of the Persian War experience on the Athenian self-image, see Gehrke (2001), (2003); Jung (2006).

64. Greg Anderson (2003) makes a strong case for the role of Cleisthenes and his associates in deliberately using preexisting myths and cults (e.g., of the new eponymous tribal heroes) to foster a new communal identity and civic ideology. Their efforts were so successful particularly because they chose to emphasize the "reassuring continuities, real or imagined, with Athenian political tradition" (103). For the institutionalization of the Athenian public funeral, see Stupperich (1977) 200–239; Loraux (1986) 15–76.

65. For this "invention of tradition" approach, with its focus on the fabrication of collective memories by the ruling classes, see especially Hobsbawm & Ranger (1983). For a lucid critique of this approach, see Misztal (2003) 60–61.

66. Kammen (1995) 329–30 and Schudson (1995) 360, for instance, offer a broad array of reasons for memory distortions.

oppression. More particular reasons for the rebellion of the thirteen original British colonies—well researched by historians—have not penetrated the general historical consciousness. This is not surprising. If individual memories are visual and semantic conceptualizations, collective memories—to be shared by a large community—have to be conceptualized and simplified to an even higher degree.[67]

Distortions in collective memories abound. Often, they are self-serving to the remembering community. An event is remembered in accordance with the group's self-image; the memory of common achievements is embellished, and that of unflattering events is suppressed. The distortions in the case of the War of Independence can be ascribed to what Rosalind Thomas calls "the narrow needs of . . . patriotism."[68] Yet there are also other processes that lead to the simplification and deformation of collective memories. Events that are not actively commemorated may be forgotten when living memory fades. If those events are remembered, the process of "distanciation" often results in a loss of detail and emotional intensity. Another factor in the process of selection and simplification of shared memories is "narrativization."[69] Generally, the past is encapsulated into and transmitted through a narrative, a story. Consequently, the resultant memory is shaped by the characteristics of this narrative. A story usually has a clear structure (beginning, middle, and end), focuses on a few protagonists, uses causal links, and displays suspense and resolution.[70]

Distortions can also result from another peculiar feature of social memory: a community's charter myth can shape and assimilate the memory of both later and earlier historical events. The French Protestants' resistance against the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in the Camisard revolts of 1702–4, for instance, became a defining image for the inhabitants of the Cévennes mountains in southern France. Collective memories of any other local events of resistance against state authority—like the resistance against German occupation and the Vichy regime—contain the same images and stories and have thus become "camisardized." Other "important" events that do not fit this pattern—like Napoleon's reign and World War I—are disregarded in the historical consciousness of the people of the Cévennes.[71] Similarly, in the course of this

67. Cf. Fentress & Wickham (1992) 47–48.

68. R. Thomas (1989) 247.

69. For distanciation and narrativization, see Schudson (1995) 348–59.

70. The narrativization and commemoration of the Great Patriotic War in Russia is an illustrative example: the "story" begins with the German attack in June 1941, which enables Russians to remember their war dead but, at the same time, "conveniently helps them to overlook the 1939 Hitler-Stalin Non-Aggression Treaty that so significantly aided the build-up of the German military machine" (Schudson (1995) 355).

71. Joutard (1977); Fentress & Wickham (1992) 92–99; Alcock (2002) 6.

investigation, it will become apparent that after the Persian War, certain earlier and later events became "marathonized," since the Persian War experience in general and the battle of Marathon in particular had a tremendous effect on Athenian self-image.[72]

Most scholars engaged in memory studies recognize both the malleability of memory and its crucial role for a group's shared identity.[73] There is, however, disagreement about the nature of the relationship between past and present. Neo-Durkheimians, on the one hand, favor a sociological interpretation and emphasize the extraordinary role of the present in the construction of the past, which functions as a symbolic resource for the creation of a common identity. From this sociological perspective, social memory serves present-day needs and interests and generates an emotional bond of solidarity. Neo-Freudians, on the other hand, argue that the past intrudes on the present and that social memory expresses the legacy of traumatic pasts inscribed in the present. They insist that

> collective memory is a social process in response to social ruptures, or discontinuities, that have occurred in the past that, because not fully assimilated in conscious experience, subsequently interfere with the smooth functioning of collective life.[74]

This psychoanalytical approach has proven especially fruitful in studies of collective experiences of war or genocide, particularly the Holocaust.[75]

Although I am much indebted to neo-Durkheimians such as Halbwachs, Hobsbawm, Fentress, and Wickham, I regard the neo-Freudian approach as an important corrective to purely functionalist interpretations.[76] Two things in particular ought to be considered. First, extreme experiences are able to alter a community's ideological framework and thus considerably influence the perception and memory of later events. Second, the past is by no means entirely at the disposal of the present; memory cannot completely override history. Strong prior remembrances, especially of a heroic or traumatic nature, are part of an obdurate historical reality that cannot be ignored.[77]

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72 For this effect of Marathon, see the section "Funeral Orations" in chapter 1, 49–58; Gehrke (2001) 302; Harding (1987) 35. For the Persian Wars as a paradigm, providing all the Greeks of the Roman imperial period with a "charter of identity," see Alcock (2002) 84.

73. Cf. Prager (2001).

74. Prager (2001) 2225. For a discussion of the neo-Freudian approach to social memory, see also Misztal (2003) 139–45.

75. For further bibliography, see Alcock (2002) 20. For studies of the memory of the Holocaust, see Friedlander (1991), (1992), (1993); LaCapra (1994); Novick (1999).

76. The traumatic aspect of a particular Athenian social memory is highlighted in "Traumatic Fear of Annihilation" in chapter 5, 291–300.

77. Cf. Schudson (1995) 351; Paez, Basabe, & Gonzales (1997). For history as a constraint, see Prager (2001) 2225; Appadurai (1981).

This complex interrelationship between past experiences and present needs has been described best by Jan Assmann: "The present is 'haunted' by the past and the past is modeled, invented, reinvented, and reconstructed by the present."[78]

Social Memory in Ancient Greece: From Mythical Times to the Recent Past

Since social memory is a wide-ranging concept, involving personal memories and communal commemoration, active memory politics and unintentional distortions, as well as a group's identity and ideology, it seems necessary to define how I shall use the term. I regard both the *communicative aspect* of sharing memories of the past and their *social relevance* for the members of a group as constitutive elements of the concept.[79] Consequently, my notion of social memory includes memories ranging from the mythical to the most recent past, memories cherished by the entire polis community as well as those shared primarily by the members of a small group.

Demarcating my use of the concept also allows me to situate my own approach within the context of other memory studies of the ancient world. It will become clear that my notion of social memory is rather broadly conceived to encompass aspects of Rosalind Thomas' oral tradition, Jan Assmann's communicative and cultural memory, Loraux' *Athènes imaginaire*, Gehrke's intentional history, Alcock's *cadre matériel*, Wolpert's civic memory, and Michael Jung's *lieux de mémoire*.[80] Exploring, in various ways, how the Greeks remembered their past and what this past meant to them, all of these scholars approach their subject from slightly different angles and thus reflect different strands of social memory studies.

Athenian Ideology and Collective Memory

In the last three decades, scholars have made great strides in disentangling the complex relationship between the Athenians' historical experience, ideology, and image of the past. In her seminal work on the Athenian funeral oration,

78. J. Assmann (1997) 9.

79. While people also share many other "memories," I will use the term exclusively to refer to the recollection of past events and experience (whether real or imaginary). Psychologists, in particular, call any recollection of previously learned information a memory. Cf. Fentress & Wickham (1992) xi; Manier & Hirst (2008) 253.

80. Cf. R. Thomas (1989), drawing on Vansina (1985); J. Assmann (1992), (1995), (1997); Loraux (1986); Gehrke (1994), (2001), (2003); Alcock (2002); Wolpert (2002); Jung (2006), drawing on Nora (1996).

Nicole Loraux brings to light the distorting influence that the Athenians' democratic and imperial ideology exerted on their version of the past: in this oratorical genre, a few selected historical and mythical events were celebrated as symbols of the never-changing noble Athenian character.[81] Similarly, Hans-Joachim Gehrke explores the interdependence between the Athenians' historical experience and their resultant self-image. After the Persian Wars, the Athenians came to see the victory at Marathon as the glorious manifestation of their role as protectors of the weak and as champions of Greek liberty.[82] Marathon was thus severed from its immediate historical context and became the quintessential event in the Athenians' "intentional history."[83] In his diachronic study of Marathon and Plataea as Greek *lieux de mémoire*, Michael Jung adds two further dimensions by focusing on the various "carriers" of these symbolic memories (rituals, monuments, literature) and by tracing their changing ideological implications and functions from the Persian Wars to Roman imperial times.[84] Finally, Susan Alcock reconstructs the *cadre matériel* of Roman Greece and makes a convincing case for the use of archaeology in ancient Greek memory studies.[85]

By examining the public commemoration and transmission of what we can call the "Athenian master narrative" (i.e., the prevalent version of the Athenian past), Loraux, Gehrke, and Jung have made significant contributions to our understanding of how the Athenians' shared image of the past is infused with democratic ideology and bound up with their self-image as hegemonic power.[86] Yet, by focusing primarily on the social significance and ideological function of outstanding events, these scholars pass over other important aspects of Athenian social memory, such as the different degrees of commemoration, the

81. See especially Loraux (1986) 132–71.

82. Gehrke (2003) 22.

83. Gehrke's "intentional history" coincides in many ways with my concept of social memory, as his definition reveals. Cf. Gehrke (2001) 298: "Intentional history would then be history in a group's own understanding, especially in so far as it is significant for the make-up and identity of the group."

84. Jung (2006) demonstrates that Pierre Nora's theoretical concept, which was developed for the analysis of contemporary French memorial practices, can successfully be applied to ancient memory studies. Following Nora (1996), Jung (2006) 15 considers *lieux de mémoire* as "literarische, symbolische, geographische oder personale Punkte, an denen sich ein kollektives Gedächtnis, die Erinnerung einer größeren sozialen Einheit konkretisieren und herausbilden kann."

85. Alcock (2002) 1–98.

86. For the term *master narrative*, see Forsdyke (2005) 242: "[T]hrough its multiple forums for collective deliberation and self-representation (the assembly, courts, theater, civic rituals and festivals) [the Athenian democracy] articulated a common version of the past that, at least in part, validated the principle of democratic rule. Democratic versions of the past, moreover—what Rosalind Thomas terms 'the official polis tradition'—formed the master narrative of Athenian history in the fifth and fourth centuries." The term *master narrative* is not meant to imply a fixed, official narrative. Rather, it denotes the sum of the converging versions of the Athenian past, which conveyed the Athenian self-image and were manifested and transmitted in the aforementioned ways. Cf. "Festivals and Public Commemorations" in chapter 1, 49–69.

interaction between different types of memories (e.g., those of the small group versus those of the polis), and the distorting influences in the actual transmission process of memories in a still widely oral society such as classical Athens.

Oral Tradition Studies

To address these aspects, I draw on the results of oral tradition research. This anthropological branch of memory studies was initially designed by ethnohistorians for the study of contemporary preliterate societies where collective memory provides the only access to these peoples' past.[87] In the last two decades, this methodology has been applied, with great success, to the study of Herodotus, whose work draws heavily on oral sources and still betrays many of the characteristics of oral communication.[88] Rosalind Thomas was the first classicist to use the concept of oral tradition for the systematic study of the interplay of various types of oral tradition in classical Athens.[89] Her findings are of paramount importance for my study, since oral traditions are the most prominent manifestations of Athenian social memory. Unlike other "carriers" of social memory, such as monuments and rituals, oral traditions preserve memories of the past in narrative form and are thus, if recorded, our best access to the Athenians' shared image of the past.

Thomas' analysis of the complex interrelation between oral traditions and the written word has led to a new understanding of the communicative conditions in fifth- and fourth-century Athens, which, despite the existence of writing, still showed many features of an oral society.[90] This is significant for two reasons. First, she demonstrates that this anthropological concept, which was first used for the study of contemporary preliterate societies, can also be applied

87. See Vansina (1965), (1985); Fentress & Wickham (1992) xi.

88. See, for instance, O. Murray (2001); Luraghi (2001); R. Thomas (1989) 4 note 4, for further literature. For exemplary studies of particular oral traditions in Herodotus, cf. R. Thomas (1989) 238–82; Forsdyke (1999). Since the 1930s, classicists have used theories of oral composition and performance for the study of the Homeric epics. For groundbreaking work, see Parry (1971); Lord (1960). For recent scholarship on Greek oral poetry, see Nagy (1996); Scodel (2002).

89. Rosalind Thomas (1989) draws particularly on the works of Vansina (1985), Finnegan (1977), and Henige (1974).

90. Rosalind Thomas (1989) 89 points out that in the law courts, for instance, fourth-century Athenians still placed more authority and trust in the testimony of witnesses than in written contracts. Thomas (1992) 15–28 argues convincingly against a strict dichotomy between oral and literate societies, as proposed by Goody & Watt (1963) or Havelock (1963). Consequently the arrival of literacy can no longer be seen as the sole cause of cultural developments, such as the rise of law and democracy or the discovery of logic. Following Thomas' lead, scholars of Greek culture now focus on the specific influence of writing on particular cultural practices like religion, law, medicine, science, philosophy, and history. Cf. Yunis (2003).

successfully to the study of an ancient, semiliterate society.[91] Writing does influence oral tradition, but "not simply by killing it."[92] By drawing on comparative anthropological studies, Thomas is able to explain many of the "distortions" in Greek oral traditions as typical results of the workings and processes of collective memory and thus provides a viable model for my case study of the memory of Thebes in Athenian historical consciousness.[93]

Second, while some aspects of social memory (especially its ideological implications and societal functions) are general characteristics observable across time and space, Thomas has made a strong case that the conditions and rules for its formation, negotiation, contestation, and transmission are specific to each culture and need to be studied within its particular context.[94] For this reason, chapter 1 of this book is devoted to the systematic study of the various ways in which fifth- and fourth-century Athenians learned about their past. Thomas' emphasis on the need to consider a society's particular communicative framework has further implications for this project. When analyzing and interpreting ancient Greek sources such as the Greek historians or the Attic orators, we have to give up the tacit presupposition that their attitudes toward oral communication, written documents, and the validation of information were the same as ours.[95] Our modern Western archive culture relies heavily on written preservation of knowledge and usually decides questions of historical authenticity by consulting documentary evidence.[96] Consequently, when politicians distort the past (whether deliberately or inadvertently), they can be called out by historians or journalists, as in the case of U.S. presidential candidate Barack Obama's erroneous claim, in a Memorial Day speech, that his uncle "was part of the first American troops to go into Auschwitz and liberate the concentration camps."[97] In classical Athens, however, people drew

91. The applicability of oral tradition research is not restricted to a semiliterate society. See O. Anderson (1990) 677. In his review of Rosalind Thomas' monograph, he criticizes her tendency to limit many features of the oral transmission of memory to the particular *transitional* situation of fourth-century Athens, asserting that even today, our social memory is constituted mainly through oral communication (through parental instruction, teaching in school, public commemorations, films). The only difference is that, thanks to our archive culture, we *can* know more, if we want to. See also Fentress & Wickham (1992) 46, 97.

92. R. Thomas (1989) 10.

93. Cf. R. Thomas (1989) 6–14.

94. While focusing on the processes of formation and transmission, Rosalind Thomas (1989) does not neglect the ideological implications and societal functions of oral traditions. Consequently, there is considerable overlap with the findings of Loraux (1986), Gehrke (1994), (2001), (2003), and Jung (2006).

95. See below for a more detailed discussion of previous studies of the orators' historical allusions.

96. For our modern archive culture, cf. Fentress & Wickham (1992) 78. Winkler (2004) stresses the importance of professional historians in modern democracies in checking and demythologizing grossly distorted versions of the past.

97. http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSN2740383620080527. On the following

their knowledge of the past almost strictly from oral sources and generally had no means (and little inclination) to fact-check. Accordingly, Athenian public speakers often took common knowledge for granted or referred to poets and the elders, who carried much more authoritative weight for contemporary Athenians than they do for us.[98]

Another merit of Thomas' work consists of her emphasis on the multipolarity of Athenian oral traditions. She demonstrates that in order to understand the complexity of the Athenian memorial framework, we have to look beyond the public funeral oration, which presents "a coherent vision"[99] of Athens' past and encapsulates only a few paradigmatic events. Apart from this "official polis tradition," she analyzes personal reminiscenses and correctly insists that "oral tradition and the stuff of oral history form a continuum."[100] Nevertheless, following Jan Vansina, Thomas defines oral traditions as "testimonies which have been transmitted over at least a generation."[101] In this respect, my concept of social memory differs from Thomas' oral tradition.[102] Since the same mental processes are at work in remembering a transmitted and an experienced incident, I also include allusions to recent events in my analysis of Athenian collective memory.

Remembered and Commemorated History

That the experiences and memories of the most recent past indeed form an important part of a community's social memory is evident from Andrew Wol-

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day, May 27, 2008, the Obama campaign corrected the error after receiving much criticism: Obama had mistakenly referred to Auschwitz instead of Buchenwald. A quick check of the historical records revealed that his great-uncle Charlie Payne had served in the Eighty-Ninth Infantry Division, which liberated Ohrdruf, a subcamp of Buchenwald, on April 4, 1945. Of course, even in our archive culture, most oral references to the past are not subjected to this level of scrutiny.

98. R. Thomas (1989) 201. For the assumption of common knowledge, see Dem. 19.65 (discussed in chap. 5); Lys. 19.48; Dem. 20.73, 21.78; Aeschin. 3.186; Lycurg. 106. For the elders as a source for knowledge of the past, see Din. 1.25 (discussed in chap. 4); Dem. 20.52, 77; Isoc. 16.4. For decrees, see Din. 1.25. Rosalind Thomas (1989) 83–93 argues that throughout the fourth century, the Athenians became slowly more document-minded and also referred to inscribed decrees.

99. R. Thomas (1989) 196–98, quotation at 196.

100. R. Thomas (1989) 11. She correctly observes that family tradition, in particular, cuts across these two distinct categories and comprises both long-standing oral traditions about one's family and the personal memories of family members involved in recent events. Fentress & Wickham (1992) 98 similarly stress the structural communalities of personal memories and oral traditions.

101. R. Thomas (1989) 13. She does, however, acknowledge that there is no strict separation between personal reminiscences (which comprise oral history) and oral tradition. Vansina (1985) 27–28 strictly separates oral tradition from oral history. He defines oral traditions as "verbal messages which are reported statements from the past beyond the present generation" and insists that there must be "transmission by word of mouth over at least a generation."

102. Another difference is her concentration on "verbal testimonies," whereas I also treat "incorporated" and material media (rituals and public monuments, respectively) as important carriers of Athenian social memory, all of which influence and sustain one another.

pert's study of how the Athenians remembered the gruesome civil war of 404/3. Wolpert shows how, after the amnesty of 403, both factions engaged in strategies of selectively remembering *and* forgetting and thus constructed a precarious, carefully negotiated civic memory of this fateful event, which prevented renewed civil strife. Two aspects of his study are particularly relevant for my investigation. First, Wolpert demonstrates that memory is not entirely at the disposal of the present and that the long-lasting psychological effects of traumatic experiences can be observed in fourth-century Athens.[103] Second, Wolpert illustrates that remembering and forgetting play out on different, yet interconnected, levels of civic discourse. Public commemorations and monuments promoted the transformation of the exiles' victory into a victory of the entire *demos* over a handful of traitors (i.e., the Thirty) and thus allowed both former oligarchic supporters and complacent democrats to identify with the victorious *demos*.[104] Yet the courts, despite the constraints of the amnesty, also served individual Athenians as a forum for recrimination and thus perpetuated the renegotiation of the memory of this bloody conflict.

A practical way to conceptualize this relationship between personal reminiscences and the collective memories of the society at large is offered by Aleida Assmann, who discerns private from public memory, that is, "remembered from commemorated history."[105] "Remembered history" is history as experienced and remembered by the individual. It is the part of collective memory that is based on everyday communication and thus also falls into the field of oral history.[106] It is necessarily "partial, biased, subjective and, therefore, also highly variegated."[107] Nevertheless, it displays several social aspects that justify including it in this investigation. First, an individual's perception and experience of history is shaped and collectivized by the group's shared mental framework. Second, personal memories show many similarities resulting from similar biographical patterns; while an event is usually remembered differently by the old and the young, women and men, soldiers and civilians, people within these subgroups share similar experiences. Third, these private memories are

103. Wolpert (2002) draws successfully on trauma studies of the Holocaust and the German occupation of France during World War II. In chapter 5, I will argue that the horrors of the Peloponnesian War and the threat of total annihilation at its end were responsible for the persistence of the proposal to eradicate Athens in Athenian collective historical consciousness.

104. Cf. the situation in the aftermath of World War II in West Germany. A collective forgetting allowed former Nazi perpetrators and "Mitläufer" to become an active part of the new democratic state, while the responsibility for Nazi crimes was laid squarely on the shoulders of the few top Nazi officials tried at Nuremberg.

105. A. Assmann (2001). These concepts have been developed jointly by Aleida and Jan Assmann, who uses the terms *communicative memory* and *cultural memory* to denote these two phenomena. Cf. J. Assmann (1992), (1997), and especially (1995).

106. J. Assmann (1995) 126. For oral history, see Joutard (1983); Passerini (1988); Thompson (1988); Levine & Sebe Bom Meihyb (2001).

107. A. Assmann (2001) 6822.

embedded in familial and social communication and thus supported by the individual memories of others.

Aleida Assmann emphasizes that remembered history consists not only of immediate personal experiences but also of the shared memories of parents and grandparents: "Thus, an embodied and participatory historical memory of approximately 100 years, is built up by oral transmission."[108] This three-generational oral memory is transient, and the memories of the first generation fade and perish as the memories of the fourth generation are added. This continuous fading out of remembered history is a normal process. Older memories that do not have any relevance for the present are thereby forgotten,[109] unless there is a strong interest in the history of ancestors (e.g., in the case of aristocratic families who sustain their social status through pedigree) or when the remembered history has a heroic or traumatic character (e.g., in the case of Holocaust survivors). The concept of remembered history is of course not restricted to families but also applies to small local communities with similar communicative conditions.

To this rather informal and erratic remembered history, we can contrast "commemorated history," a second, more organized type of social memory.[110] Unlike remembering, commemorating refers to an "intentional, formalized, and collective action."[111] Consequently, commemorated history covers past events, the memory of which seems important enough to a community to be made permanent. In the transition from remembered to commemorated history, both material and performative media play an important role.[112] In classical Athens, material media included monuments, inscriptions, relics, and books.[113] Performative media are symbolic forms of action, including rites, festivals, and ceremonies. As in the case of ceremonial commemorations at a memorial site, material and performative media are often combined.

108. A. Assmann (2001) 6823. Cf. J. Assmann (1995) 127.

109. This continuous fading out of remembered history causes the so-called floating gap in nonliterate societies where the historical consciousness is divided between a three-generational recent past and a mythical past of heroic character. Cf. A. Assmann (2001) 6823.

110. See also Manier & Hirst (2008), who use the psychological concepts "collective episodic memory," "collective distant/lived semantic memory," and "collective procedural memory" to establish a taxonomy of Jan Assmann's (1995) communicative and cultural memory.

111. A. Assmann (2001) 6823. See also Schudson (1995) 348, who distinguishes between three realms of social memory, (1) socially mediated individual memories (Assmann's "remembered history"), (2) cultural forms of social mediation, and (3) individual memories constructed from the cultural forms (Assmann's "commemorated history").

112. A. Assmann (2001) 6823. This classification corresponds to Connerton's (1989) distinction between "inscribed" and "incorporated" memorial practices. According to Jan Assmann (1995) 129, "cultural memory" is maintained through "cultural formation (texts, rites, monuments) and institutional communication (recitation, practice, observance)."

113. For a useful definition of *monument*, cf. Alcock (2002) 28.

Public and private memory mutually influence and sustain each other.[114] For public memory to retain its social relevance, it needs to be underpinned by the private memory of individuals who engage in communal commemorative activities. Most of the participants in rites of remembrance bring with them memories of family members touched by these vast events. This is what enables later generations to commemorate wars or revolutions "as essential parts of their lives."[115] At the same time, commemorated history often exerts a distorting influence on private memory, as we can see in Barack Obama's reference to his uncle liberating Auschwitz or, to a much larger extent, in Andocides' recollection of his (aristocratic) ancestors' services to the Athenian democracy.[116] Sometimes, however, remembered history can also be used to challenge the predominant master narrative of the community.[117]

Collective Memories of the Mythical Past

In the previous section, I have made the case that historical allusions to recent events ought to be included in this study. It is necessary to also look at the other end of the spectrum and decide whether paradigms drawn from the mythical period should be considered in this study of the orators' use of the past.[118] There are various reasons for their inclusion.

First, fifth- and fourth-century Greeks regarded stories that we would classify as mythical (i.e., as unhistorical or fictitious) as accounts of their past; not even Thucydides, the father of critical historiography, casts any doubt on the historicity of the Trojan War or the reign of King Theseus.[119] Even though the Attic orators usually acknowledged the Herodotean division of the past into a mythical and historical period (Hdt. 1.5, 3.122) and distinguished between

114. Fentress & Wickham (1992) 100–101. The Rock War of Kalymnos provides an excellent example. This 1935 clash between Italian *carabinieri* and the women of this Greek island is remembered differently by participants, by men and women, and in its local and national context. For a detailed discussion, see Alcock (2002) 11–13; Sutton (1998) 79–98.

115. Winter (2001) 12522.

116. For Andocides, see R. Thomas (1989) 139–44. For Obama's erroneous historical reference, see note 97 above. The fact that the name *Auschwitz* has become a synonym for the Holocaust in U.S. collective memory (as well as the insufficient familiarity with European geography) might explain the substitution of Auschwitz for the widely unknown subcamp Ohrdruf in the family memory of the exploits of Obama's great-uncle Charlie Payne.

117. See R. Thomas (1989) 237. Aeschines, for instance, challenges the chauvinistic Athenian master narrative by pointing to the city's foolish mistakes during the Peloponnesian War. To corroborate his assertions, he names his father and uncle as authoritative sources for these memories (Aeschin. 2.74–78); cf. "Different Memory Communities" in chapter 1, 70–84.

118. For a concise discussion of the nature of Greek myth with further bibliography, see Bremmer (1987b).

119. Cf. Thuc. 1.9–12 (on the Trojan War), 2.15 (on Theseus' synoecism of Attica). See Grethlein (2007) 363.

examples from the distant and the recent pasts, this distinction is never clear-cut, and the border between myth and history is rather fluid.[120]

Second, these myths fulfill the same social function as collective memories of historical events. These myths were an integral element of the communal memory of the different social groups that populated Attica. They aided the Athenians in understanding "who they were, where they had come from, why they worshipped the gods they worshipped or had the institutions they had."[121] Aristocratic families increased their social status and prestige by claiming descent from famous Homeric heroes.[122] Local heroes functioned as eponyms for fictive kinship groups or local communities.[123] While some of these claims date far back into the archaic period, others, such as those involving the Cleisthenic tribal heroes, were rather recent and represent examples of "invented traditions."[124] All of these heroes had mythical stories attached to them that provided the members of the group with a shared image of their past and fostered group identity.[125] The social memory of these mythical heroes was manifested and transmitted by, among other things, religious cults and festivals, which deserve special attention when dealing with the orators' allusions to the mythical past.[126]

Third, in oratorical practice, there is no essential difference between paradigms drawn from the mythical period as opposed to the historical one. The paradigmatic function is the same: both feats, the repulse of the Amazons in the time of Theseus and the victory over the Persians at Marathon, were equally able to symbolize Athens' "timeless" character as champion of the Greeks; and indeed, both examples were used by Athenian speakers in diplomatic contexts.[127] This is evident, for instance, from the Athenians' argument for the priv-

120. Gotteland (2001) 94–102; Perlman (1961) 158–59; Loraux (1986) 136–37; Todd (2008) 212. On the "antiquity" of myth, see, for instance, Aeschin. 2.31; Isoc. 4.30, 68; Lycurg. 83. For "ancient" times contrasted to "what is more recent," see Thuc. 1.73.2; Dem. 23.65, 60.8–9; Isoc. 6.24, 42. Cf. Parker (1996) 227.

121. Harding (2008) 3. Cf. Gehrke (2001) 286, 297–306; Krummen (1993) 215.

122. Miltiades, for instance, traced back his ancestry to Ajax's son Philaeus. Before the use of writing, aristocratic families remembered only three or four recent generations (cf. Aleida Assmann's "remembered history") and the heroic ancestor. This "floating gap" was eventually closed through the construction of full genealogies that involved manipulation, adding new generations and incorporating ancestors who were remembered in a vacuum; cf. R. Thomas (1989) 155–73.

123. Melite, for instance, functioned as eponymous heroine for the Attic *deme* Melite (Philochorus *FGrHist* 328 F 27), and Munichus (*IG* II² 4590) had his sanctuary in the harbor Munichia in the Piraeus. Both had their own mythology; cf. Kearns (1989) 184–87.

124. For a comprehensive discussion of Attic heroes, see Kearns (1989). For the Cleisthenic tribal heroes, see Kron (1976); Parker (1996) 102–21; G. Anderson (2003) 123–34.

125. For the social functions of tribal heroes, see Parker (1996) 120–21; Kearns (1989) 86–92. For an example of the interplay of cult and mythology, see Parker (2005) 446.

126. Cf. "Cults and Festivals" in chapter 1, 65–69.

127. Cf. Clarke (2008) 289–90.

ilege to command the left wing at Plataea (Hdt. 9.27).[128] There are many other instances where speakers indiscriminately use examples from both the mythical and historical pasts. Urging the Spartans to conclude peace, the Athenian ambassador Callias mentions the shared distress about the recent destruction of Plataea and Thespiae (allies of Athens and Sparta during the Persian Wars) and reminds them of the benefits Heracles received from the mythical king Triptolemus (Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.4–6). Similarly, in diplomatic negotiations with Philip of Macedon, Aeschines claims the city of Amphipolis for Athens by arguing that this area had first been acquired by Theseus' son Acamas and had recently been confirmed as Athenian possession by Philip's father and others at a congress in Athens (Aeschin. 2.31–33).[129] Aristotle's *Rhetoric* further confirms that mythical and historical examples were used side by side in oratorical practice.

> How could we praise [the Athenians], if we did not know of the naval engagement at Salamis or the battle of Marathon, or what was done on behalf of the Heraclidae, and other similar things?[130] (Arist. *Rh.* 1396a12–14)

This shows that in Athenian social memory, the aid to the children of Heracles was on par with the historic victories at Marathon and Salamis.

Constitutive Elements of Social Memory

To sum up, drawing on the work of Loraux, Gehrke, Jung, Alcock, Thomas, Wolpert, and Assmann, I will use the concept of social memory in its broadest sense for my investigation of the role of the past in Athenian public discourse. I regard both the *communicative aspect* of sharing memories of the past and their *social relevance* for the members of a group as constitutive elements of the concept. In view of this definition, this study will need to consider the collective memory of events ranging from the mythical to the most recent past. Moreover, both the memories cherished by the entire polis community and those shared by smaller subgroups are part of the Athenian memorial framework. Consequently, both "remembered" and "commemorated" history ought to be

128. Higbie (1997) discusses the Athenians' and Spartans' negotiation with Gelon (Hdt. 7.159, 7.161.3) and the Athenian-Tegean dispute at Plataea (Hdt. 9.26–27) and emphasizes the great authority attributed by the Greeks to arguments from the mythical past.

129. For the use of myth in classical Greek diplomatic and political discourse, see Markle (1976); J. K. Davies (1993) 162; Parker (1996) 226–27; C. P. Jones (1999) 6–35; Natoli (2004a) 66–73. For the Hellenistic period, Gehrke (2001) 295 argues that "[m]yth and history had the same status" in *poleis* diplomacy. For the Athenian claim to Amphipolis, see Rhodes (2010) 232–33.

130. Grimaldi (1988) 281; Allan (2001) 25–26 note 21.

taken into account.[131] Demosthenes' previously cited allusions to the Persian War battles (Dem. 18.208) obviously qualify, since he recalls to the jurors events that have been memorialized by a variety of means (monuments, public commemorations, rituals, etc.). These battles function as *lieux de mémoire* and are deeply meaningful for the Athenian self-image.[132] Yet, the personal recollection of one of Lysias' clients fulfills both criteria (social relevance and communicative aspect) as well (Lys. fr. 286 Carey). This Athenian recalls in court how he and other Athenian exiles found asylum and support in the house of the otherwise unknown Theban Cephisodotus during the tyranny of the Thirty. This memory is certainly meaningful to him and his fellow exiles, since their Theban host aided them in their struggle against the Thirty (Lys. fr. 286.2). It also lies at the heart of the guest-friendship relationship between his family and his benefactor's.[133] It was this very memory, he claims, that drove him to action when, after the Spartan capture of the Cadmea in 382, Cephisodotus' son Pherenicus sought refuge in Athens (Lys. fr. 286.3). This passage allows us to observe how the private memory cherished by a small group was shared with a wider Athenian audience in the law courts. By mentioning the time of exile, it prompted and thus reinforced the widely shared collective memory of the rise and fall of the Thirty. Yet, at the same time, it also functioned, to some extent, as a corrective to the patriotic master narrative that by and large ignored the aid of the Thebans and usually begins the story of the democrats' glorious return with Thrasybulus' capture of Phyle.[134]

Social Memory in Athenian Public Discourse

So far, I have discussed some general characteristics of social memory and delineated my use of the concept in relation to other studies of the Greeks' memorial framework. In this section, I turn to the role that social memory played in Athenian public discourse and decision making. After a short exposi-

131. See also Fentress & Wickham (1992) x, for a similarly broad definition of "commemoration" (i.e., the public and social side of memory) as "the *action* of speaking or writing about memories, as well as the formal re-enaction of the past that we usually mean when we use the word."

132. Jung (2006).

133. See "*Xenia* and *Proxenia*" in chapter 1, 80–84.

134. Cf. chapter 4. For a modern example of how the shared memory of a small group could be used to challenge the prevalent master narrative, see the 1997 debate of the German parliament concerning the controversial exhibition *War of Annihilation: Crimes of the Wehrmacht, 1941–44*. Challenging the exhibition's verdict of the Wehrmacht as a criminal institution, the conservative leader Theo Waigel drew on his childhood memories to argue that the majority of soldiers had been honorable men of integrity: he recalled how, at the end of the war, Oskar Blümm, a general of the Wehrmacht stationed near Waigel's hometown, courageously protected the remaining inmates of a hospital for the mentally ill from murderous SS units. Cf. Thiele (1997) 206; Nolan (2001).

tion of my notion of public discourse and decision making, I will introduce my main sources, the Attic orators and the speeches in Xenophon's *Hellenica*, and briefly discuss previous approaches to the orators' historical allusions, before I set out my own methodological principles.

Social memory in classical Athens was constituted and transmitted in a variety of ways. The polis as a whole represented an idealized version of the past to itself in various public forums, such as public festivals and commemorations, monuments, dramatic plays, and the assembly and law courts. At the same time, different subgroups cherished their own traditions, which might either concur or compete with one another or with the Athenian master narrative. To get a sense of this complex memorial framework, one ought to take each of these carriers of social memory into account. Yet, in order to observe the negotiation of different versions of the past and assess the role they played in actual policy decisions, we have to turn to one specific area of Athenian public discourse, that is, the *political* discourse of the assembly and the law courts.[135]

Public Discourse and Decision Making

In a study that involves such allusive subject matter as people's memories and motives for action, I intend to be explicit about my underlying assumptions concerning the nature of collective memories, political discourse, and decision making. My premise is that social memory serves a double function in political debates. It provides a pool of collective experience for the perception and analysis of present realities, but it also serves as a repository of symbols and metaphors for the communication and illustration of a given problem to others and for effectively persuading the citizenry to pursue a particular policy to solve it.

For my analysis, I build on Ober's semiotic model of political discourse. In his study of mass and elite communication in classical Athens, he describes the role of symbols and metaphors in public discourse in general.

> Communication between the members of a society, especially in the context of political decision making, will make use of symbols (metaphors, signs) which refer to and derive from ideology. . . . The theoretical basis for this statement ultimately derives from a semiotic model of cognitive psychology that assumes that the human mind works through the process of analogy by means of symbols or metaphors. Thought and perception, and therefore language, are symbolic and metaphoric; thus,

135. For "political discourse" as "public discourse" in the narrow sense, see C. Calhoun (2001) 12594.

communication is based on complex and intertwined symbolic references and cross-references.[136]

Ober furthermore asserts that the recipients of these symbolic and metaphorical messages will judge the soundness of the argument and the trustworthiness of the speaker on the basis of their own set of values and beliefs: "An individual's decisions, actions, and judgment of his or her fellows will be based, at least in part, upon ideology and symbolic communication."[137]

Ober's assumptions concerning the role of symbols and metaphors in discourse in general can easily be applied to the specific symbols and metaphors derived from a community's collective memory. Apart from their importance for the perception and illustration of a current problem, a third function of these symbols (not mentioned by Ober) is worth emphasizing. Social memory creates feelings of identity and group solidarity. As a result, symbols derived from social memory carry "heavy emotional weight."[138]

Accordingly, social memory functions as "symbolic capital," which is used by political leaders to create representations of the world in the past and present that others are willing to follow.[139] As Geertz, Bourdieu, and other adherents of Durkheim have argued, determinants in politics include not only material forces and common interests but also symbols, which are used to imagine and represent political groups and institutions and are employed to both legitimate and undermine the political status quo.[140] But the exact meaning of these symbols and the collective memories from which they derive are never fixed and can be contested, modified, and reinterpreted at any time by political agents struggling for dominance in the realm of symbolic capital.[141]

People in leadership positions often utilize the symbolic capital derived from their community's collective memory to garner support for particular policies.[142] At times, however, politicians advocate policies that seem to be at odds with the values and beliefs of their political community. In these cases, we

136. Ober (1989) 40.

137. Ober (1989) 41.

138. Kertzer (2001) 13175.

139. For symbolic processes and capital, see Bourdieu (1991); S. Harrison (1995); Apter (2001). Apter analyses the role of symbolic capital within political discourse.

140. Cf. Fortes & Evans-Pritchard (1940); Geertz (1985); Bourdieu (1991); S. Harrison (1995); Kertzer (2001). The theory of the politics of memory that focuses on the cultivation and invention of public rituals and traditions as modes of social control has first been explored by Hobsbawm & Ranger (1983). For a critique of this presentist approach to social memory, see Misztal (2003) 56–61.

141. Fentress & Wickham (1992) 129 characterize social memory as the "substructure of national historical consciousness, a largely uncontrollable rhetorical field inside which all political actors themselves have to operate."

142. Cf. Demosthenes in his *Second Philippic* (Dem. 6.7–12). See "Treacherous by Nature" in chapter 2, 143–49.

can see how political speakers use elaborate arguments to challenge commonly held views and we can see how they try to redefine the lessons to be drawn from the group's shared historical experience.

A good example of such an attempt could be observed at the extraordinary convention of the German Green Party on May 13, 1999, when the Green foreign minister Joschka Fischer sought his party's approval for the German participation in NATO's military intervention in Kosovo.[143] The Green Party, founded in 1980 by environmental and pacifist movements, had a strong antimilitaristic ideology.[144] Fascism, World War II, and the Holocaust were remembered as abhorrent crimes leading to the conviction "War, never again! Auschwitz, never again! Genocide, never again! Fascism, never again!"[145] Fischer used his party's collective memory of the Nazi past and its symbolic meaning, but he redefined it to support his policy of military intervention.[146] Whereas the two maxims "War, never again!" and "Auschwitz, never again!" were originally understood almost as a tautology, indicating the two sides of one coin and expressing Green pacifism vigorously, Fischer separated these two lessons from the past and made the prevention of Auschwitz and genocide the main priority.[147] By using the loaded terms *ethnische Kriegsführung* and *völkische Politik*[148] for Milosevic's policies, Fischer equated the Yugoslav regime with German Nazism. In so doing, he employed the symbolic meaning his party attributed to Auschwitz to show the necessity of military intervention in Kosovo in order to stop another genocide. The pacifist component "War, never again!" was thereby separated and ranked as secondary. For his attempt to modify his party's memory of the Nazi era and its meaning for the present situation, Fischer could fall back on the collective memory of German conservatives. In their eyes, the lesson to be drawn from the experience of World War II is different and does not generally forbid German military interventions.[149]

My endeavor to assess the influence of arguments from social memory on

143. See Erp (2003) 169. For Fischer's speech, see online at http://www.mediaculture-online.de/fileadmin/bibliothek/fischerjoschka_kosovorede/fischer_kosovorede.pdf.

144. Cf. the *Grundsatzprogramm* from 1980 and the *Offenbacher Friedensmanifest* from 1981.

145. Cf. Fischer's pledge to the credo of the Green party: "Aber in mir—ich stehe auf zwei Grundsätzen: Nie wieder Krieg, nie wieder Auschwitz; nie wieder Völkermord, nie wieder Faschismus: beides gehört bei mir zusammen. Und deswegen bin ich in die Grüne Partei gegangen."

146. For Fischer's earlier attempts to reshape the Green Party's collective memory and ideology in light of the atrocities in Bosnia in 1995, see Erp (2003) 164.

147. For the role of collective memory in this German policy debate, see also Markovits & Reich (1997) 11.

148. Fischer's use of the term *völkische* is especially remarkable. Owing to its strong associations with Nazi ideology, it is no longer used in contemporary German discourse. By employing Nazi terminology to characterize Milosevic's policies, he implicitly equates Milosevic to Hitler.

149. In "Challenging the Master Narrative" in chapter 2, 149–54, I make the case that Demosthenes, similarly, challenged the Athenian master narrative of the Thebans as archetypical medizers.

actual policy decisions in fourth-century Athens presupposes that such arguments did in fact play a significant role, which is an assumption not all scholars share. Many ancient historians seem to adhere to a model of politics that considers the maximization of self-interest the primary, if not the only, factor in politics—a theory that, applied to the international arena, became famous under the name of Realism. Realism downplays international law, morality, domestic politics, and the possibility of interdependence and views states as the prime actors in a hostile anarchic environment, in which they incessantly pursue power and security according to rational criteria of self-interest.[150] Many historical studies of fourth-century Greece apply these principles of *Realpolitik* to explain the reasons for the various shifts in the diplomatic policies and military alliances that took place in this volatile century.[151]

Our sources leave no doubt that participants in the debates frequently used historical analogies, invoked the ancestors' heroic achievements, or pleaded to repay former benefactions. Such arguments are, nevertheless, not taken fully into consideration as historical factors.[152] They are often dismissed as merely "rhetorical," that is, as empty phrases that are used by the speakers to conceal self-serving interests and are irrelevant for the explanation of a chosen course of action.[153] The prevalence of this explanatory model is not surprising, given the powerful influence exerted by one of Realism's acclaimed founding fathers, Thucydides, who identified Sparta's fear of Athens' growing power as the "truest yet least talked about reason" for the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 1.23.6). It would be a mistake, however, to reduce Thucydides' multifaceted historical account to a confirmation of Realist theory.[154] Thucydides' interest in power politics is undeniable. Yet, just because he viewed self-interest as an important political force does not mean that other factors did not play a role as well. His Mytilenaean debate is a case in point. Both of his set speeches are based on arguments of expediency. Yet he himself lets us know that the Athenians regarded the previous day's decision as "cruel and excessive" and that, in the

150. Cf. Morgenthau (1948); Waltz (1959); Markovits & Reich (1997) 8–10; Ober (2001) 274–75; Stein (2001); Kegley & Wittkopf (2004) 35–42.

151. Cf. Mosley (1971); Hamilton (1979); Cartledge (1987); Buckler (1980), (2003); Buck (1998); Buckler & Beck (2008). Badian's (1995) exploration of the impact of the memory of fifth-century imperialism on fourth-century Athenian foreign policy is a welcome exception.

152. Admittedly, some historians do mention such arguments, if they are reflected in our sources. But they usually do not ascribe much significance to them. Cf. Hamilton (1979) 150–51; Cartledge (1987) 283; Buck (1998) 68–70. See the discussion of Thebes' volte-face following the Peloponnesian War in "The Situation in Thebes in 404/3" in chapter 4, 215–32.

153. See, for instance, Hamilton (1979) 201–2, analyzing the speech the Theban ambassadors delivered in Athens in 395 BC (Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.8–15). Hamilton appreciates its Realist arguments but dismisses the rest as "rhetorical or tendentious."

154. Low (2007) 16–21; Ober (2001).

renewed debate, "different opinions were expressed on both sides of the issue" (Thuc. 3.36) before Cleon and Diodotus took the stage. Based on what we know of political speeches in the fifth and fourth centuries, those unnamed speakers very likely made conventional appeals to the Athenians' sense of pity and justice.[155]

Another reason why the Realist paradigm is so attractive to ancient historians might lie in the fact that its principles (maximization of self-interest, pursuit of power and security, alliances and balance of power) seem universally applicable and do not require us to consider more subjective factors, such as people's memories and beliefs. Granted, it is difficult to reconstruct the collective memory of people in the past, but this should not lead us "to erase the presence and power of the past from their lives."[156]

Undeniably, political decisions are largely based on considerations of self-interest, and fourth-century public speakers did make such arguments.[157] Yet individuals and collectives generally tend to consider other, not strictly utilitarian factors as well, such as issues of morality, self-image, and prestige.[158] Recent studies have shown, for instance, that in Greek culture, reciprocity is a normative principle that governs the relationships between individuals as well as states.[159] Consequently, when promoting an alliance, public speakers recall past benefactions that ought to be repaid.[160] In this form, arguments from social memory hold considerable argumentative and emotive force in political debates. Furthermore, it would be wrong to view considerations of self-interest

155. Hornblower (1991) 419; Pelling (2000) 119, 122. Several speeches in Thucydides also employ arguments from social memory to a large extent. See, for instance, the Plataeans' appeals to the Spartans in 429 and 427 (Thuc. 2.71 and 3.53–59, respectively). Cf. Hornblower (1991) 445.

156. Alcock (2002) 24.

157. To counter Aeschines' moralistic arguments, Demosthenes, for instance, declares that the Athenians saved the Spartans in the 360s not thanks to their virtue but because it was useful (συμφέρον) for Athens (Dem. 19.75). Similarly, Aeschines claims that the Athenian-Theban alliance of 339 should not be credited to Demosthenes; it resulted from the crisis, fear, and Thebes' need for an alliance (Aeschin. 3.237, 239). Isocrates declares expedience (τὸ ὠφέλιμον) to be the main criterion in foreign politics (Isoc. 5.42–45), but only in order to counter the anticipated objection that cities will never be able to overcome the collective memory of their long-standing hatred toward each other (5.39–41). Earlier in this address to Philip, Isocrates himself draws heavily on arguments from collective memory, demonstrating the good services rendered to Philip's ancestor Heracles by Argos, Thebes, Sparta, and Athens (5.32–34).

158. Sometimes they also give in to irrational impulses such as feelings of anger or elation, as Aristotle's excursus about the emotions in book 2 of his *Rhetoric* shows; cf. Kennedy (1991) 122–24. For Demosthenes' evocation of emotions and the importance of honor and prestige in Athenian foreign policy debates, see Montgomery (1983) 105–7. Yunis (2000) makes a convincing case that Demosthenes won the case against Aeschines in 330, precisely because he rejected a success-oriented model of politics and evoked a shared image of the past that resonated with the jurors on an emotional level.

159. Herman (1987) 130–42; Gehrke (2001) 291–92; Low (2007) 36–54.

160. See Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.13 and 6.5.33, 40, 44; Isoc. 14.1, 57.

and moral obligations as *generally* antithetical and incompatible, as Thucydides' Melian dialogue suggests.[161] More often, different kinds of arguments are used that can complement and reinforce each other in the decision-making process. In view of this, it is not surprising that Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, a handbook on the art of public speaking that reflects the fourth-century oratorical praxis, lists various means of persuasion (arguments based on *logos*, *ethos*, and *pathos*) and accommodates both arguments of expediency (τὸ συμφέρον) and evocations of mutual obligations and justice (τὸ δίκαιον).[162] For historians to focus exclusively on the principles of *Realpolitik* in reconstructing fourth-century foreign politics is, therefore, reductionistic.

Studies of present-day foreign relations confirm that collective memory is indeed a factor to be taken into account. The political scientists Markovits and Reich make a convincing case that contemporary German foreign politics cannot be explained within the realist paradigm. Germany's reticence to take on international responsibilities in accordance with its economic and military abilities is due largely to an ideology "shaped by the collective memory of Germany and its neighbors."[163] Similarly, the traumatic memory of German expansionism and occupation is still so deeply entrenched in the collective historical consciousness of many Europeans that it can cause them to make political decisions contrary to their objective self-interest. The Danes, for instance, voted initially against the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in June 1992, even though they could expect large economic benefits from the creation of the European Union. Only on the second vote did they overcome their profound suspicion of Germany and vote "with their brains and not their hearts," as one Dane put it.[164]

Another aspect of Markovits and Reich's study is worth mentioning. Over time, neighboring states generally experience phases of intense rivalry and outright war as well as periods of peaceful coexistence and cooperation. As a result, their collective memory comprises both negative and positive views of their neighbors, which are available to buttress either antagonistic or cooperative policies.[165] Most of Germany's neighbors ultimately supported Germany's reunification, thanks particularly to their recent, positive experiences, despite the horrors they had suffered under Nazi occupation. In a similar vein, I will

161. Cf. Low (2007) 160–77.

162. On these three artistic means of persuasion, see Kennedy (1991) 14. Since arguments from social memory are often emotionally charged and thus can fall into the rubrics *ethos* and *pathos*, social memory fits well within Aristotle's framework for persuasion. For the view that justice and expediency are often interdependent and can coincide, see Arist. *Rh.* 1362a20, 1362b28; [Dem.] 7.46; Isoc. 15.79; [Arist.] *Rh. Al.* 1425a10–16. For a lucid discussion of this issue, see Low (2007) 166–73.

163. Markovits & Reich (1997) 4 (for their critique of realism, see 8–14).

164. Markovits & Reich (1997) 26, 96–99.

165. Markovits & Reich (1997) 28.

argue that even though the Thebans generally occupied an overwhelmingly negative place in Athenian historical consciousness due to their alliance with Xerxes (see chap. 2) and their proposal to eradicate Athens (see chap. 5), the Athenians, nevertheless, did not entirely forget Theban aid for the Athenian democrats in 404/3. I will make the case (see chap. 4), that this memory, while precarious, was from time to time revived in Athenian public discourse and helped move the Athenians to conclude the Athenian-Theban alliance of 395 and to offer asylum to Theban refugees after the Spartan seizure of the Cadmea in 382 and after Philip's and Alexander's victories over Thebes in 338 and 335. Considerations of *Realpolitik* surely played an important role in these decisions. I contend that the memory of Thebes' support for the Athenian *demos* in 404/3 was a significant factor in these debates, as it offered the Athenians another good reason to cooperate with their generally despised northern neighbors.[166]

Participant Evidence: The Attic Orators and Their Interpretation

For their study of present-day German and European foreign policy, Markovits and Reich were able to draw on a wealth of data. Comprehensive records of political debates, newspaper articles, and countless opinion polls allowed them to assess the attitudes of both leading politicians and the electorate at large and thus to gauge the influence of collective memory on particular policy decisions. It is much harder for students of ancient history to reconstruct the role the past played in a community's decision making.[167] Sometimes Greek and Roman historians briefly mention collective memories that were, in their view, decisive factors in a particular historical situation. In 371 BC, for instance, the Athenians, according to Xenophon, favored peace negotiations with Sparta because they had grown angry at their Theban ally for "annihilating cities [i.e., Plataea and Thespiae] that had been faithful in the war against the barbarian [i.e., the Persian War of 480–479] and were friendly to Athens" (Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.1). It is even more difficult, however, to observe how *individual* politicians operated within an ancient society's memorial framework and how competing social memories were negotiated and contested in political debates.

In the case of fourth-century Athens, we are extremely fortunate, since the corpus of the ten Attic orators contains the texts of about 140 speeches, most of

166. Given the confines of a monograph and the already existing thorough treatments of *Realpolitik* in the fourth century, I will limit my discussion to the role of social memory in these debates, which I regard as not a replacement of but a complement to, rational calculations of self-interest.

167. Often, those who study ancient history have to put bits and pieces of scarce evidence together just to get a glimpse of what people in the past might have thought about their past. Cf. Alcock (2002).

which were—if not verbatim, then at least in this approximate form—actually delivered in the Athenian assembly, in the law courts, or on public occasions.[168] They can therefore be regarded as "participant evidence" for fourth-century Athenian political discourse.[169] These speeches are full of references to the past and can thus be used for studying both the content of Athenian social memory and its use within the political arena.

For several reasons, I have decided to use speeches from Xenophon's *Hellenica*, even though they certainly do not represent the original speeches verbatim. Xenophon, however, was a contemporary of the events he reports and participated in Athenian memory communities of the fourth century. He was often in a position to witness the speeches he relates or to learn their content from trustworthy sources.[170] But even when he composed speeches himself, we can assume that he was guided by what the speaker in a particular situation would have been likely to say; Xenophon knew Athenian attitudes well enough to apply those arguments from the past that were usually made in the Athenian assembly and that appealed to an Athenian audience. Consequently, his speeches are an important source for reconstructing fourth-century Athenian social memory.[171]

Thanks to their timeless quality as rhetorical masterpieces and their priceless value as participant evidence for fourth-century history, the speeches of the Attic orators have long been a primary object of scholarly attention. Particu-

168. For a complete list of these speeches, see Ober (1989) 341–49. Following MacDowell (2000) 22-26 and Hunt (2010) 270-74, I generally view the extant texts as drafts of the actual speeches, which underwent only minor revisions before publication. For a more pessimistic view concerning the authenticity of the transmitted speeches of the Attic orators, see Worthington (1991b), (1992) 37. He suggests that speeches were heavily revised to impress an elite reading audience with literary sophistication. Wolpert (2002) 146, however, argues correctly that orators, if they revised their speeches before publication, "would not render the published version less persuasive." Instead, they would try to make their speeches more convincing by improving passages that had not pleased the original mass audiences. Consequently, the revised speeches are an even closer reflection of widely shared collective memories and beliefs. Cf. Hunt (2010) 273–74. Isocrates' speeches are a bit more problematic, since most of them were not written for delivery before an actual mass audience. It is evident, however, that his discourses are composed to closely resemble actual speeches; they are structured in the same way, contain the same types of arguments, and draw on the same collective memories as the speeches delivered by other Athenian orators. Cf. Naiden (2006) 182; Clarke (2008) 301. For this reason, it is justified to include them in this investigation.

169. Potter (1999) 22 notes, "Participant evidence is provided by texts purporting to report or influence a specific event, or closely linked series of events, by a person who was involved either as an actor or witness."

170. Cf. Buckler (1982); Dalfen (1976). For an approach to the speeches in Thucydides that is similar to my approach to Xenophon's speeches, see Ober (1989) 46–47; Pelling (2000) 112–22. See also Gotteland (2001) 12–14, who includes historiographical speeches in her analysis of the use of myth in political discourse.

171. Loraux (1986) 133 also noticed Xenophon's Athenocentrism concerning his use of historical examples in a speech delivered in Xen. *An.* 3.2.11–14.

larly, the orators' use of the past has already been studied extensively. Before I set forth the methodological principles of my own approach, a brief discussion of previous interpretations of the orators' historical allusions seems in order. A critical analysis of their underlying assumptions will show that yet another take on this well-known body of evidence is justified.

Three (overlapping) approaches can be discerned.[172] One group of scholars has analyzed historical allusions from the perspective of classical rhetoric, according to which well-known historical examples are to be employed as illustrations of current situations and thus as artful means of persuasion.[173] The examples were supposedly drawn from a more or less rigid set of historical *topoi*.[174] While it is certainly warranted to analyze historical paradigms as part of an orator's rhetorical technique and as formal elements within the overall rhetorical structure of a speech, this approach also has some shortcomings. It presupposes that the orators closely followed the prescriptions of rhetorical theory. Consequently, historical allusions are categorized in an attempt to reconstruct the underlying rhetorical doctrines.[175] These often overly schematic studies ignore that classical rhetoric, which stemmed from the analysis of oratorical praxis, ought to be regarded as a secondary phenomenon.[176] Indeed, it is hard to imagine that Demosthenes tried to fit his speeches into such a theoretical corset.[177] Moreover, there is no evidence for a written collection of historical *topoi* from which the orators would choose, and a rigid set of orally transmitted *topoi* cannot exist due to the fluid and dynamic nature of oral discourse.[178] In addition, by focusing almost exclusively on the speakers' rhetorical techniques, these studies underrate the sociopolitical aspect of the orators' allusions to the past. Due to their frequency, such allusions are often dismissed as empty rhetorical commonplaces. Such a stance, however, ignores that the memories of these events were deeply meaningful to the respective community.[179] A snide remark by the Greek intellectual Plutarch reveals the sustained effectiveness of allusions to the Persian Wars—*the* historical *topos* par excellence—more than

172. For discussion of these approaches, see Perlman (1961) 150–53, (1986) 359; Robertson (1984) 382–83.

173. That fourth-century rhetoricians indeed reflected on the systematic use of historical examples to further the orator's cause is evident from Isocrates (1.34, 2.35, 4.9) and Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (1368a29–30, 1393a26–b2).

174. Worthington (1992) 20.

175. See especially Jost (1935); Nouhaud (1982).

176. Perlman (1961) 150 calls it "a clear example of putting the cart before the horse."

177. Already Dionysius of Halicarnassus showed in his *First Letter to Ammaeus*, on the basis of chronology, that Demosthenes could not have used Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.

178. Perlman (1961) 150–51 convincingly refutes the existence of a rigid set of *topoi*.

179. Ober (1989) 44 notes, "Rhetorical topoi were repeated by different orators over time; they were therefore familiar but certainly not empty of content. Indeed, topoi were reiterated precisely because of their symbolic value and demonstrated power to influence an audience." Wolpert (2002) 139 argues similarly concerning the frequent allusions to the Thirty.

half a millennium after the actual events: public officials were still able to "stir up the multitudes" by recalling Marathon, the Eurymedon, and Plataea, which made "the masses swell and prance about in vain" (Plut. *Mor.* 814a–c).[180]

In a second line of approach, historians have tried to determine the mutual influence of the Greek historians and the Attic orators. Some scholars investigated the extent to which Isocrates' rhetorical theories influenced fourth-century historiography,[181] while others tried to detect the orators' historiographical sources by careful philological analysis. The results of the latter inquiry were rather disappointing, for the orators' version of historical events often diverged considerably from extant historiographical accounts. This has led to the verdict of the orators' "truly astonishing ignorance"[182] of the history of their city. Considering the fact that our main sources for the history of classical Greece consist of a small corpus of literary texts, it is not surprising that intertextual references are a primary object of historical and philological studies. Yet the basic underlying assumption of such an approach—namely, that fourth-century Athenians regarded the works of the historians as an important authority for historical knowledge (or at least should have done so)—has been shown untenable by Rosalind Thomas. She has demonstrated that classical Athens was still predominantly an oral society where the written word had much less authoritative weight than in our modern archive culture.[183] To expect fourth-century Athenian politicians to comply with historiographical standards established by nineteenth-century historians is not only anachronistic but disregards our own experience of the use of the past in contemporary political discourse.[184] Political debates, rather than historiographical works, are therefore the proper backdrop for analyzing and judging Athenian oratory.[185]

A third group of scholars, more sensitive to the political aspects of Athenian oratory, views the orators' historical allusions as a reflection of contemporary political attitudes. In a seminal article, Pearson proposed that the well-educated orators "were willing to respect the prejudices and the sensitiveness"[186] of their ignorant audience and were at pains to avoid giving the impression of lecturing them on history.[187] Other scholars have tried to detect signs of manipulation and propaganda used by the orators to further their immediate political

180. Alcock (2002) 84.

181. Cf. von Scala (1892) 102–21 on Isocrates; Barber (1935) 75–83 on Ephorus; G. Murray (1946) 150–53 on Theopompus.

182. Jacoby *FGrHist* 3b (Suppl.) i.95.

183. See R. Thomas (1989) and my discussion under "Oral Tradition Studies" above, 21–23.

184. Cf. Bach (1977) on historical allusion in contemporary German political discourse.

185. Harding (1987) 36, 38.

186. Pearson (1941) 229.

187. Pearson (1941) 213 ascribes, for instance, the orators' frequent references to family tradition and common knowledge to their anxiety not to display their superior knowledge and their bookish learning. Cf. Blass (1874) 7. Similarly, Ober (1989) 179.

goals.[188] I share with this group of scholars the objective of situating the orators' historical allusions within their own sociopolitical context, yet I disagree with some of their underlying assumptions. Most of these scholars assume that an accurate knowledge of history was available to the orators. History is often seen as "something ready-made, waiting to be 'used' by the orators."[189] Erroneous, inaccurate, and vague accounts are interpreted as either pretended ignorance before the uneducated masses or as conscious distortion and political propaganda. Certainly, Athenian politicians used the past to their own advantage; yet to regard every discrepancy as a willful manipulation, motivated by the orator's self-interest, ignores two crucial points.[190]

First, given the communicative conditions of fourth-century Athens, we cannot assume that the orators had a definite knowledge of what happened in the past, which they then deliberately distorted to manipulate their audiences. Social memories are fluid and dynamic. Memory studies show that, apart from deliberate falsification, there is a host of alternative and equally plausible explanations for the distortions in the orators' representations of the past.[191] Consequently, I shrink from using the term *propaganda* in this context, since it is so closely associated with the modern phenomenon of mass communication and manipulation.[192] There is no question that the Attic orators vigorously advocated and promoted their ideas and policies and tried to sway public opinion by any means possible; yet political propaganda and demagoguery are two phenomena that belong more to the history of totalitarian regimes in the twentieth century, with its archival and technical possibilities, than to fourth-century Athens.[193]

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188. On the orators' manipulation and political propaganda, see especially Perlman (1961); Nouhaud (1982); Harding (1987); Worthington (1994a); Weißenberger (1996); Paulsen (1999). Similarly, Allroggen (1972) ascribes the orators' differing views of historical figures and events to their respective political affiliation. Adopting Pearson's (1941) approach, Milns (1995) surveys the historical paradigms in Demosthenes' public speeches.

189. Robertson (1984) 381, on Nouhaud (1982).

190. Worthington (1994a) 109 offers a verdict that is emblematic for this view: "That the accuracy of the historical information contained in speeches by the Greek orators is open to doubt is no small understatement. . . . [T]he orators lie, distort, deliberately deceive, suppress the truth, and prevaricated as a matter of course." Similarly, Harding (1987) 38 notes, "In short, they were liars and cheats and their words cannot be trusted on any topic, unless supported by independent evidence." For a critique of such "cynical" interpretations of modern U.S. memory distortions, cf. Kammen (1995) 329–30. See also Schudson (1995) 360 and the section "Ideology and Social Memory" above, 13–19.

192. Similarly, R. Thomas (1989) 206 note 39: "The term 'propaganda' is misleading because it implies (i) systematic dissemination and (ii) that the disseminators know their propaganda to be untrue. In the context of oral transmission, both orators and audience had little means of distinguishing mere propaganda from Athenian history." Exploring the use of myth as propaganda, Bremmer (1997) draws on this modern concept but links it closely to the concept of social memory.

193. For the pejorative connotation of the term *propaganda*, see Chaffee (2001) 9326. As a

Second, most of these scholars focus on the role of the speaker. Yet we should keep in mind that it was the orator's objective to convince his listeners, who would base their decisions on his credibility.[194] Even if an orator was aware of diverging versions in Herodotus or Thucydides,[195] he was likely to follow a more widely shared version, since his recounting of a specific event was "checked" by the expectations and memory of his audience.[196] Moreover, I assert that the widespread assumption that the orators' historical allusions reveal a low level of historical knowledge among common Athenians is misconceived. The fact that regular Athenians had a less accurate view of Athenian history than Herodotus or Thucydides does not mean that they did not care about their past. Quite the opposite is the case, as this monograph seeks to demonstrate.

One concrete example should suffice to illustrate the difficulties in how best to approach the orators' historical allusions. In 343 BC, in his indictment of his fellow ambassador Aeschines, Demosthenes decried the pitiful fate of the Phocians, whose towns had been demolished at the end of the Third Sacred War (356–346 BC). He concluded his description of the Phocians' pathetic plight with the words

> And yet, that these men [i.e., the Phocians] once voted against the Thebans when they made a proposal for our enslavement, I hear from you all [ὑμῶν ἔγωγ' ἀκούω πάντων]. (Dem. 19.65)

When dealing with the orators' historical paradigms, the first (obvious) task is to determine which event an orator is alluding to. Here, Demosthenes is referring to an incident that happened sixty-one years earlier, at the end of the Peloponnesian War in 404 BC. Xenophon reports that the Spartans and

result of the rise of *Ideologiekritik* in Germany after the "1968 Revolution," German classicists are particularly fond of exposing the orators' manipulations. See, for instance, Paulsen (1999) 17, on the goals of his commentary on Dem. 19 and Aeschin. 2: "Und vielleicht das Wichtigste: Beide Reden sind exemplarisch für die Wirkungsweisen von politischer Propaganda und Demagogie, deren Mechanismen zu durchleuchten und Gefahren zu erkennen von überzeitlichem Interesse ist."

194. Ober (1989) 43–44 points to the orator's duty, as prescribed in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, to "accommodate himself to the ethos—the ideology—of his audience." This also applies to social memory, which is closely linked and intertwined with ideology.

195. Rosalind Thomas (1989) 201–2 argues against the notion that the orators possessed superior knowledge and consciously "descended to an alien level of historical ignorance purely for the gratification of their audience."

196. R. Thomas (1989) 200; Clarke (2008) 300, 303.Wolpert (2002) xiii notes, "The stakes in deliberative and forensic oratory were too high for a speaker to risk professing values that the audience did not endorse." This also applies to attitudes concerning past events. Harding (1987) 37 emphasizes that most Athenians "were well informed about contemporary affairs" and that the orator, therefore, "had to show that he was conversant with the details, if he was to maintain his credibility as a political adviser."

their allies were discussing the terms of Athens' surrender at a conference in Sparta, when

> the Corinthians and Thebans in particular, but also many other Greeks, spoke against making a treaty with the Athenians and proposed to destroy their city. The Lacedaemonians, however, refused to enslave a Greek city that had done great service in the greatest dangers that had befallen Greece. (Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.19–20)

The proposed annihilation of Athens is frequently evoked in the extant speeches of the Attic orators, but Demosthenes' allusion is our earliest reference to the role of the Phocians. As a result, previous commentators find Demosthenes' assertion "I hear from you all" baffling, quickly dismissing it as "a simple phrase without any particular weight,"[197] as a rhetorical trick employed by a clever politician to make his innovation acceptable to his audience. Demosthenes' rhetorical strategy is clear enough. He masterfully contrasts the recent destruction of the Phocians with their (alleged) opposition to the proposed destruction of Athens; Athens' failure to reciprocate and do the same for the Phocians in 346 is squarely placed on Aeschines' shoulders (Dem. 19.64–66).[198]

Orators indeed frequently employ phrases like "as you all know" or "as you all remember" in their references to the past. In his *Rhetoric,* Aristotle comments on the suggestive power of this *topos:* even if the listener is not familiar with a particular fact, he will agree with the speaker out of embarrassment at his ignorance of what was supposedly common knowledge (Arist. *Rh.* 1408a32–36).[199] Consequently, commentators suspect conscious manipulation on the part of the orator whenever this phrase accompanies a new or (to us) unknown version of past events.[200] Yet, while the "you all know" *topos* could indeed have this effect, it does not follow that the audience is necessarily unfamiliar with the incident in question. This is evident from the fact that this very *topos* is also used for such notorious events as the Trojan War or the Persian Wars.[201]

197. Nouhaud (1982) 306 notes, "Il est plus curieux que le fait soit très connu au point que Démosthène puisse affirmer: ὑμῶν ἔγωγ' ἀκούω πάντων. Il s'agit sans doute encore d'une simple formule sans portée particulière." Nouhaud concedes, however, that the Phocians might have been among the unnamed majority of cities that ultimately followed the Spartans in their refusal to destroy Athens. Similarly, Weil (1883) 269; Paulsen (1999) 123.

198. In his rhetorical categorization of the orators' historical allusions, Nouhaud (1982) 78 note 218 lists this paradigm under the rubric "Confrontation de deux situations."

199. See Pearson (1941) 215–19; Ober (1989) 149–50, 180.

200. Cf. Pelling (2000) 28–29, who calls this the "truth universally acknowledged" ploy. For the "only a topos" fallacy, see Rhodes (1994) 157–58.

201. See, for instance, Lycurg. 62 (Troy), 75 (Persian Wars); Isoc. 6.99–100 (Thermopylae). Concerning Demosthenes' use of this topos, Pearson (1941) 219 admits that "the great majority of

Similarly, since speakers frequently point to the memory of older citizens when introducing historical paradigms, such prefatory remarks have been seen as the orator's way to avoid "giving the impression that he knew more about the past than the average citizen."[202] It is true that these remarks shift the corroborating authority away from the speaker and thus convey a measure of modesty. Yet we cannot invert the argument and conclude that since this *topos* is employed, the incident must have been unfamiliar to the audience. In Athens, the elders were indeed the most important and authoritative source for knowledge of the past.

For these reasons, we should not dismiss references to the elders or the "as you all know" *topos* a priori but should further investigate whether the orator's claim to recall a widely known collective memory might in fact be true. Concerning Demosthenes' Phocian paradigm, I will argue that it is indeed likely that Demosthenes had "heard it from them all" in 343.[203] The outcome of this investigation can shed new light on the effectiveness of this particular historical example. If we are able to determine how Demosthenes' contemporaries felt about the memory of their proposed annihilation and what they thought about the proponents and opponents of this plan, we are in a much better position to gauge how this argument might have resonated with his audience.

Procedure and Methodological Principles

As I mentioned earlier in this introduction, a survey of the corpus of the Attic orators and the speeches in Xenophon's *Hellenica* shows that fourth-century allusions to Thebes cluster around four particular events, each discussed in a separate chapter in this book: Thebes' medizing in 480–479 (chap. 2), the mythical story of the burial of the fallen Argives (chap. 3), Thebes' support for the Athenian democrats in 403 (chap. 4), and the Theban proposal to eradicate Athens in 404 (chap. 5). Each chapter begins with a brief discussion of the extant oratorical references to the event in question, which will reveal their most striking features. In each case, I explore how the event was perceived by contemporaries, why and how it was remembered, and how this memory was transmitted down to the time of the speakers.[204] It will become apparent that

his historical allusions are to famous events and characters in Athenian history, of which the patriotic Athenian certainly liked to be reminded."

202. Ober (1989) 181. Cf. Pearson (1941) 217–19.

203. For a full discussion of this particular allusion, see "The Role of the Phocians" in chapter 5, 331–36. I will make the case that, since listing former benefactions was a regular feature of Greek diplomatic discourse, references to the Phocians' vote against the Theban proposal to eradicate Athens were probably a regular part of the Phocians' lobbying for Athenian support during the Third Sacred War (356–346) and were therefore indeed as familiar to the Athenians by 343 as Demosthenes claims.

204. The mythical chapter 3 on the burial of the fallen Argives is the obvious exception, since

this process could vary considerably depending on the nature of the particular memory.

The memory of Thebes' medizing, examined in chapter 2, was so intrinsically linked to the Athenian self-image after the Persian Wars that a variety of means transformed it from "remembered" to "commemorated" history. Young Athenians learned about the Athenian and Theban roles in the Persian Wars as part of the official polis tradition in regular, polis-wide public commemorations and festivals, while landmarks, monuments, and inscriptions functioned as material reminders and constituted the Athenian *cadre matériel.*

In chapter 3, I examine the constitutive elements of the mythical story of the Athenian intervention on behalf of the Seven against Thebes and explore the reasons why—out of the enormous pool of Greek myths—this particular collective memory came to be one of the four paradigmatic myths celebrated in the Athenian master narrative of the funeral orations. A study of the various carriers of this collective memory, including local cults, the tragic stage, and pictorial representations, will show that it was seen as a prefiguration of the hegemonic Athenian self-image, derived from the Persian War experience. Its frequent use by fifth- and fourth-century speakers reveals the importance of collective memories from the mythical period in Greek inter*poleis* diplomacy. Owing to the enduring Athenian-Theban enmity throughout most of the classical period, the memories of Thebes' medism and its coercion by Athens to return the bodies of the fallen Argives remained socially relevant for the Athenians and ensured their transmission to younger generations.

The memory of Thebes' aid for the democratic exiles around Thrasybulus, discussed in chapter 4, was much more precarious. Due to the long-standing Athenian-Theban antagonism, we do not find any polis-wide efforts to commemorate this generous Theban act in Athens. Since memories fade without repeated retrieval, private memories and the assembly and law courts were of paramount importance for the preservation of this memory. Based on various clues, I argue that former democratic exiles (bound by the norms of guest-friendship) were able to reinstill this latent memory in Athenian public discourse on various occasions throughout the fourth century, when Athenian aid for Thebes was under discussion. This is to be expected in a society where repaying former benefactions is a normative principle in personal and inter-*poleis* relations.[205] Moreover, social memory studies show that similar political

it is not based on a historical event. But even in this case, we can examine partial shifts in emphasis and the various means of transmission of this collective memory.

205. Similarly, Rosalind Thomas (1989) 247 suggests that the Spartan request for Athenian aid during the Helot revolt of 462 might have been responsible for keeping the memory of their role in ousting the Peisistratids alive in fifth-century Athens.

constellations can refresh the memory of otherwise forgotten events. The arrival of Theban refugees in Athens after the capture of the Cadmea by a Spartan-backed junta could thus prompt the memory of Theban assistance to Athenian refugees in Thebes at the time of the Thirty. Drawing on these characteristics of social memory, I am able to explain how this precarious memory was transmitted from 404 down to 323, where it first appears in our extant texts.

In chapter 5, I make the case that the traumatic experience surrounding Athens' surrender was responsible for the unusual persistence of the memory of Athens' proposed eradication in 404. Furthermore, I will argue that the general Greek concept of a ritual city destruction by a Greek alliance, as it was remembered for the case of Crisa, played a role both in the actual discussion of Athens' fate and in the preservation of this memory beyond the boundaries of Athens. Consequently, Thebes' advocacy for the annihilation of Athens as well as its medism were common knowledge throughout the fourth century and, not surprisingly, were marshaled by Alexander the Great to justify his destruction of Thebes in 335.

In each chapter, I compare the extant historical allusions to one another but also to the actual historical events, as far as we can reconstruct them with the help of historiographical sources, material evidence, and analytical reasoning. This allows us to see distortions more clearly, but it is, admittedly, also a tricky endeavor. I do not want to fall back into the earlier scholarly paradigm that viewed the Greek historians as the guardians of an almost Rankean truth; after all, they operated within the same communicative framework as their contemporaries, the orators.[206] Yet there are distinct differences between the genres of historiography and oratory. The orators' goal was persuasion, and social memories were employed for the purpose of winning the argument. The Greek historians investigated the past and tried to promote what they regarded as the historical truth; often, they responded to and reacted against other historians.[207] This does not presume that they always provide a trustworthy and historically accurate account, but their report is usually much more detailed and "the one generally accepted by historians as most reliable."[208] Yet their versions should be accepted not at face value but only after a careful historical analysis that takes into account other testimonies and the historical context of the event in question. Such testimonies also include the much later reports of Diodorus Siculus and Plutarch in cases where their accounts are known to be derived

206. Marincola (2007) 105–6.

207. See, for instance, Thucydides' correction of two misapprehensions "of the other Greeks" concerning the votes of the Spartan kings and the Pitanate division (Thuc. 1.20.3), which is undoubtedly aimed at Herodotus. Cf. Hornblower (1991) 57–58.

208. R. Thomas (1989) 7.

from contemporary sources, such as the fourth-century Oxyrhynchus historian and Ephorus.[209] The juxtaposition of the orators' versions with ancient and modern reconstructions of the events can reveal certain distortions. By taking into account the workings and processes of social memory, I try to explain various deformations in the process of transmission.[210]

Naturally, not all of the orators' historical allusions were equally familiar to their audiences. I will use internal and external clues to assess how widely known a specific social memory was and how much argumentative and emotive force it possessed. The way in which an orator alluded to a particular event can thereby serve as an internal indicator of its familiarity. Persian War memories, for instance, were so prevalent that the names of the battlefields were sufficient to evoke the symbolic meaning of these quintessential events, as seen in Demosthenes' implicit comparison of his compatriots who fought at Chaeronea to the Athenian heroes of Marathon, Plataea, Salamis, and Artemisium (Dem. 18.208).[211] Since these paradigmatic memories lay at the heart of Athenian identity and were actively commemorated with monuments and festivals, the speaker was likely to strike an emotional chord and thus sway public opinion.

Sometimes, however, an orator analyzing a given situation might arrive at a solution for which the Athenian master narrative did not provide a suitable parallel. In this case, the orator could draw on alternative sources of knowledge of the past. Individual Athenians were not only exposed to the official polis tradition; they also fulfilled different social roles as companions and guest-friends and as members of their families, *demes*, and tribes, thus participating simultaneously in several subgroups that fostered their own collective memories. Consequently, individual orators were familiar with different versions of the past, from which they chose the most suitable for their purpose at hand. There are various clues that indicate when an orator relies on a less familiar historical example: he offers numerous cues (historical personage, places, dates) to aid his listeners in recollecting a particular event, makes a rather elaborate argument, or corroborates his assertion by pointing to the particular source of his paradigm.[212]

Apollodorus, for instance, deemed it necessary to remind his audience of

209. Diodorus Siculus, in particular, is known for following his sources generally very closely. Cf. Stylianou (1998) 132.

210. See the section "Ideology and Social Memory" above, 13–19.

211. Cited at the opening of this introduction.

212. Dinarchus, for instance, mentions both the dissolution of the democracy and Thrasybulus' mustering of the Athenian exiles in Thebes as cues for the memory of Theban aid (cf. Din. 1.25, discussed in chap. 4 of this book). For Demosthenes' elaborate reinterpretation of the lessons to be drawn from Thebes' medizing (Dem. 14.33–34), see "Challenging the Master Narrative" in chapter 2, 149–54.

the Marathon painting in the Stoa Poikile to offer proof for his claim that the Plataeans had indeed come to the aid of the Athenians ([Dem.] 59.94)—a fact that is often omitted in the official polis tradition of this quintessential Athenian victory.[213] Often, the orator does not reveal the source for his version, and we have to investigate on our own whence he might have acquired his knowledge of the specific historical incident. In this case, monuments, inscriptions, public commemorations, festivals, literary sources, and other carriers of social memory can serve as external indicators of how familiar this particular version was to the audience and how much argumentative and emotive force it possessed.

213. Cf. "Remembering the Plataeans" in chapter 2, 127–42.